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The law of the sea, as it has developed through the
centuries, is "best characterized, not as a mere static "body
of absolute prescriptions, hut more appropriately as a liv-
ing, growing system of customary law, the roots of which
are grounded in the claims, practices and sanctioning ex-
pectations of individual states. The regime governing the
seas is, therefore, highly changeable,, being subject to
constant shifts in the demands and expectations of states
as affected by the imperatives of developing social,
economic, technological and other interests and conditions.
In practice, the seas are governed by a continuing process
of interaction in which states assert diverse and often
conflicting unilateral claims to competence over and use
of the seas, which are weighed and evaluated along with
competing claims by other states and international bodies,
and ultimately accepted or rejected.
Historically, the main function of the law of
the sea has been to achieve a reasonable balance in this
process of interaction between the exclusive demands,
claims and interests of the various states, and the more
general inclusive demands and interests of all of the states
in the world community. The policy of the law of "the sea,




order through shared use of, as well as shared competence
over, the oceans, and by striking a reasonable balance of
the inclusive interests of all states as against the spe-
cial, exclusive interests of individual states, in order
2to achieve the greatest production of values for all.
Until relatively recent times, states indicated
recognition of their common interest in shared use and
competence over the seas by claiming only a relatively
narrow strip of territorial sea over which comprehensive
exclusive authority was exercised and honored, while the
world community, for its part, sought to establish an
appropriate balance of interests by honoring such restrained
claims. The result of this accomodation was to protect
the legitimate exclusive interests of the coastal state,
such as authority to control or deny passage, jurisdiction
over vessels and events occurring on board, regulation of
navigation and authority to exclude foreigners from
fishing. At the same time, with regard to more inclusive
interests, the acceptance of a narrow territorial sea by
the world community left the vast areas beyond the immediate
coastal strip open to all for purposes of transportation,
communication, research and fishing. The success and
viability of the traditional regime arising out of this
delicate balancing of interests is demonstrated not only
by its contribution toward the effective production and
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wide sharing of values, "but, more importantly, "by its develop-
ment into a presumption favoring inclusive claims to the
widest possible productive access to the oceans. The
viability of the traditional regime based on this presump-
tion was such that not until very recently did states begin
to assert territorial sea claims significantly wider than
the time-honored three-mile breadth.
Today, unilateral territorial sea claims, often to
vast areas of what was formerly high seas, based primarily
on exclusive national interests, are encroaching significantly
upon the traditional community policy of maintaining the seas
as a common resource available to all for the peaceful
purposes of transportation, communication and exploitation
of resources. The most expansive such claims, those of
certain Latin American states claiming 200-mile margins,
are so well known as to require no more than a passing
mention. Less well known, but equally expansive, are
claims asserted by states with regard to delimitation of
the territorial seas of island groups and the attendant
implications of such claims to the maintenance of an
effective system of public order for the oceans.
In this regard, the difficult question arises as to
groups of islands of whether their territorial seas should
be measured from the coast of each individual island or by
application of a method whereby the territorial sea is to
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"be regarded as relating to the group as a unit or a whole,
and, therefore, measured from a system of baselines con-
necting the outermost islands of the group.
The problem of delimiting the marginal seas of
groups of islands, or archipelagos, in common with the
general problem of delimiting the territorial sea, is
affected by a number of factors including a lack of gen-
erally accepted limits for the breadth of the territorial
sea; a lack of well-developed and universally accepted
delimitation techniques and principles; the tendency of
states to act with regard to their national interests with
a view toward preserving and promoting their own exclusive
economic, political and security goals; and the essentially
unilateral character of the act of delimitation due to its
dependence on the geographical, historical and economic
circumstances of each state.
An archipelago is, perhaps, most simply defined
as a formation of two or more islands, islets or rocks
which geographically may be considered as a whole. The
matter becomes more complex, however, when one considers
the possible variations in geographical characteristics of
archipelagos. Such variations include number and size of
the component islands; size and position of the group
itself; compactness or wide dispersion of the group, etc.
Essentially, however, for the purposes of this study,

- 5 -
archipelagos may "be divided into two "basic types, namely:
coastal and outlying (or mid-ocean). The former category
consists of those groups situated so closely to a mainland
coast as to reasonably be considered a part thereof, while
the latter comprises those groups situated in the ocean at
such a distance from the mainland as to be considered in-
dependent units rather than as forming a part of the main-
6land. This study will focus on this second category with
emphasis on an appraisal of the territorial sea claims of
archipelagic states, such as the Philippines, Indonesia and
the Republic of Maldives.

CHAPTER II
PRINCIPLES OE INTERNATIONAL LAV/ RELATING TO
THE DELIMITATION OE THE TERRITORIAL
WATERS OF ISLAND GROUPS
Writings of International Lav/ Publicists
For the most part, international law publicists in
treating the specific problem of the territorial waters of
archipelagos have done so only incidentally to discussions
of the overall topic of the extent and delimitation of
territorial waters. In general, however, where they address
themselves directly to archipelago problems, the tendency
has been to regard island groups as units with ensuing
legal implications, as will become apparent in this study,
favorable to the claims of archipelagic states.
Thus, Colombos states in broad terms that:
"The generally recognized rule appears to
be that a group of islands forming part of
an archipelago should be considered as a
unit and the extent of territorial waters
measured from the centre of the archipe-
lago. In the case of isolated or widely
scattered groups of islands, not consti-
tuting an archipelago, the better view
seems to be that each island will have
its own territorial waters, thus excluding
a single belt for the whole group. Whether
a group of islands forms an archipelago
or not is determined by geographical
conditions, but it also depends in some x





Jessup is in fundamental accord with the foregoing
view. The rule adopted in his treatise, The Lav/ of Terri-
torial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction
,
is as follows:
"In the case of archipelagos the constituent
islands are considered as forming a unit and
the extent of territorial waters is measured
from the islands farthest from the center of
the archipelago. "8
Schwarzehberger likewise states that "if islands
form an archipelago, they may in certain circumstances
9be regarded as a unit in lav/."
Reasoning in a more cautious vein, and primarily
from the standpoint of coastal groups, Hyde appears to
hold that archipelagos may legally "be regarded as units.
In his work, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and
Applied by the United States
,
he states:
"Where, however, a group of islands forms a
fringe or cluster along the ocean front of
a maritime State it may be doubted whether
there is evidence of any rule of interna-
tional law that obliges such State invariably
to limit or measure its claim to waters
around them by the exact distance which
separates the several units. "10
Writing shortly after the Hague Codification Con-
ference of 1930, the French jurist, Gidel, adopted somewhat




In the case of an archipelago situated at adistance from the coast (an oceanic archipe-
£S?<V he dellmit ation of the territorial sea
rules W^6 ^ con£°™ity «"* the ordinary*that is around each island individuallyreserving from the operation of this rule any
ofthe fhT ***$ ^ result f^0m application
ZLcl L f TJ, 0f historic waters. No more








-^°n *? ° te^orial seas^andt into internal waters,
.thereby accordingtl^TCSSelS the risllt of Accent &
While recognizing that little attention had been paid to
the problem by the various learned authors who touched
upon it in their treatises, Philippine and Indonesi;
legal scholars, such as Coquia and Syatauw, neverthel,
rely to some extent upon their view that archipelagos may
be treated as units for support of their nation's claims. 12
.an
.ess
Conventional Law — Attempts at Hn^fS^n- lon
The Hague Codification Confere-nr.fi f 1930
Although the question was addressed at meetings of
various learned international legal societies in preceding
years, the question of the delimitation of the territorial
waters of archipelagos received its first thorough examina-
tion at the Hague Codification Conference of 1930. 13 To
aid in the conduct of the conference's preliminary .work, the
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preparatory committee submitted a schedule of points, in
effect a questionnaire, to participating governments
soliciting their positions on various aspects of the law
concerning territorial waters. The schedule of points
covered a wide range of topics including the nature and
content of the rights possessed "by a state over its
territorial waters; application of coastal state rights
to the air space above and the sea bottom and subsoil
beneath territorial waters; determination of baselines;
straits; innocent passage; hot pursuit; as well as the
question of territorial waters around islands. The latter
question was phrased: "A group of islands; how near must
islands be to one another to cause the whole group to
14possess a single belt of territorial waters?"
As might be expected, there was much diversity in
the replies received. The British, with whom Australia and
South Africa, as well as other states, concurred, replied
in the following terms:
"In the case of a group of islands, each island
will possess its own belt of territorial waters
whatever the distance between the islands, there,-
will not be a single belt for the whole group."
Japan's reply agreed with the British view in gen-
eral, but added the proviso that: "if, however, the distance
between no two adjacent islands among the outlying islands
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of the group exceeds ten nautical miles, the whole group
may be considered as a single entity, the width of the
territorial waters being measured outwards from the out-
lying islands of the group." 16
On the other hand, Finland, 17 Norway, 18 and
Sweden, 19 perhaps because of their peculiar geography,
in their replies tended to favor the position of regarding
archipelagos as units.
In analyzing the various replies, the preparatory
committee observed that the unitary concept raised the
following questions:
(a) What is the greatest permissible distance
between the islands at the circumference of the group?
(b) What, if any, maximum permissible distance
is there between islands within the group, even in cases
where the distance between islands at the circumference
is not in excess of the maximum permissible distance?
(c) What is the legal status of the waters between
the islands?20
As will become apparent in this study, these three
questions remain unanswered to this day and are still among
the principal components of the archipelago problem.
The diversity of views that predominated during the
preparatory stages of the conference also reflected three
main currents of opinion among the states represented: (a)
delimitation of a single belt of territorial seas around a
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group of islands is permissible only if the component is-
lands are not farther apart than a certain maximum distance;
(b) both coastal and outlying archipelagos must be considered
as units, regardless of the distance between component is-
lands; and (c) the regime suggested under (b) above, with
the added proviso that it apply only where warranted by
geographical peculiarities. Of course, parallel with all
of these views ran the connected question of whether waters
enclosed within the archipelago should be regarded as
internal waters or as territorial seas. 21 The preparatory
committee attempted to answer the questions it had deduced
from the various governmental positions, as well as to
effect a compromise among the various opinions put forward,
in the following proposed rule, submitted as Basis of
Discussion No. 13:
"In the case of a group of islands which belong
to a single State and at the circumference of
the group are not separated from one another
by more than twice the breadth of territorial
waters, the belt of territorial waters shall
be measured from the outermost islands of the
group. Waters included within the group shall
be territorial waters."
"The same rule shall apply as regards islands
which lie at a distance from the mainland not-
greater than twice the breadth of territorial
waters."
The committee, thus, proposed considering archipelagos
as units, but in reply to the first question, laid-- down a
distance of twice the breadth of the territorial sea as the
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maximum distance between islands at the circumference.
The proposed rule's silence on the second question may
perhaps be taken as an indication that no maximum distance
between internal islands was intended. As to the third
query, the Committee plainly wished the regime of the
territorial seas to govern enclosed waters.
At the Conference proper, very little was achieved
in the way of concrete results on the topic of archipelagos,
The subcommittee to which the question was referred was
unable to reach agreement on a definitive rule, giving as
its excuse a lack of sufficient technical information. It
is interesting to note, however, that in the preliminary
discussions of the problem, no distinction was made between
the rules applicable to coastal as opposed to outlying or
mid-ocean archipelagos, even though it was recognized that
geographical conditions varied considerably between the two
23
categories of island groups.
The International haw Commission
In 1952, when Professor Francois, as Special
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the Law
of Sea, submitted his first report on the regime of the
territorial sea, he devoted a special rule to the question
of groups of islands. This rule, Article 10 of his first
draft, applied without distinction to "groups of islands"
~
•*.
(archipelagos) and "Islands situated along the coast." As
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to both categories, the draft article provided that baselines
not greater than ten miles in length might be adopted for
measuring the territorial sea in the direction of the high
seas. It was also stipulated that waters included in the
group should constitute internal waters.
There was some overlapping between this proposed
article and Article 5 of the draft, which, on the basis of
the decision of the International Court of Justice in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, provided for application of
straight baselines where "...a coast is deeply carved with
indentations and cuts, or bordered by an archipelago." 25
Professor Francois, in his second report, clarified
the relationship between the initial drafts of Articles 5
and 10 by modifying Article 10 so as to apply to "groups
of islands stretching along a coast." The provision for
ten-mile baselines was retained, but mention of the charac-
ter of enclosed waters as internal was omitted. 26
Article 12(1) of Professor Francois' third report,
the final wording considered by the Commission, first defined
the phrase "group of islands" to mean three or more islands,
provided they enclose a portion of the sea when joined by
straight baselines not exceeding five miles in length, except
that one such line might extend to a maximum of ten miles. 27
Paragraph 2 of draft Article 12 provided that the baselines
between islands should be used for measuring the territorial
sea and that the waters lying within the area bounded by
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these lines should he considered as internal waters. The
five-mile limitation on baselines had the effect of limiting
considerably the number of cases in which the straight base-
line method could be applied to archipelagos. The concession
of allowing one ten-mile baseline was apparently an attempt,
according to Professor Sorenson, to assimilate the waters
enclosed by a group of islands to the rule laid down in
draft Article 9 providing for a ten-mile closing line for
bays. Again, draft Article 12 contained no provision con-
cerning a maximum permissible distance between islands within
the group, and, therefore, no limitation as to areas of water
PP
which might be enclosed within the baselines.
In June 1955, draft Article 12, now styled as pro-
visional Article 11, was considered by the Commission.
Professor Francois explained to the Commission that the
five-mile maximum distance between islands was necessary
in order to safeguard the freedom of the seas and to prevent
large areas of the high seas from becoming enclosed as
internal waters. He suggested, however, that, by analogy
to the Commission's decision relative to the closing lines
of bays, the maximum length of the one long line be increased
to 25 miles. 29
Mr. Garcia Amador of Cuba expressed himself as being
in basic agreement with Professor Francois' text of Article
11, but proposed omission of any maximum length limitations
on baselines, since the Commission had not imposed these
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m provisional Article 5 dealing with coastal archipelagos.
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, on the other hand, maintained that
some limit was necessary, inasmuch as the whole idea of
having a special provision for groups of islands was to
allow enclosed waters to be regarded as internal waters,
and, consequently, the islands should be reasonably close
31to one another. There being considerable divergence of
views as to the implications of the provisional article
for different types of archipelagos, it was agreed to
delete it altogether.
The question arose again, however, at the next, the
eighth, session of the International Law Commission in 1956
when the government of the Philippines, in its observations
on the draft articles, expressed the opinion that special
provisions should be made to take into account the archipe-
lagic nature of certain states such as the Philippines.
This caused some controversy; however, the Commission did
not go any further into the matter, but confined itself to
inserting a commentary into its report to the General As-
sembly calling attention to the problem, pointing out the
lack of technical information on the subject and expressing
the hope that if an international conference were to
subsequently study the proposed rules it would give attention
34-
to the problem of groups of islands.
V
-b —
The Geneva Conference and the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
The rule contained in Article 10, as adopted by the
International Law Commission at its eighth session, reads,
in pertinent part: "Every island has its own territorial
sea. As mentioned above, however, the commentary of the
36 ...Commission^ made it perfectly clear that this provision
was not intended to settle the difficult problem of
archipelagos for all time. Unfortunately, this was not
to be the case, as the Geneva Conference followed the pro-
posals regarding coastal archipelagos, while ignoring
altogether the guestion of outlying or mid-ocean island
groups. Thus Article 4- (1) of the Convention reads:
"In localities where the coast line is deeply
indented and cut into, or if there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity, the method of straight
baselines joining appropriate points may
be employed in drawing the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured.'
Needless to say, the problem was very much in evi-
dence at the Conference; however, again nothing concrete
in the way of solutions was forthcoming. The question was
studied in a preparatory document, drafted at the request
of the United Nations Secretariat by the Norwegian jurist,
38Jens Evensen. He, essentially, concluded that in many
cases it would be only natural and practical to treat
outlying groups of islands as a whole by drawing straight
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baselines between their outermost points. Such a dispen-
sation, however, would depend, according to Evensen, to a
large extent upon the geographical features of the archipe-
lago concerned. He, therefore, proposed a rule on outlying
archipelagos to the effect that, if a group of islands
belonging to a single state may reasonably be considered
as a whole, straight baselines, as provided for by Article
4 of the Convention on the Territorial Seas, may be applied
for the delimitation of the territorial seas. Enclosed
areas would be considered as inland waters, but would
remain open to innocent passage of foreign vessels where
they form straits.
During the course of the debate at the Conference,
the representative of the Philippines argued that compact,
outlying archipelagos should be treated as a whole, with
the waters lying between and within the islands of the
group considered as internal, and that such groups should
be surrounded by a single belt of territorial sea. The
Indonesian delegate also expressed the opinion that an
archipelago should be regarded as a single unit, the ter-
ritorial sea of which should be measured from baselines
drawn along the outermost points of the outermost islands.
He stressed the vita], importance which security of communi-
cations represents to the archipelagic state, particularly
in times of national emergency. Indonesia's representative
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also expressed regret that the International Lav/ Commission
had "been unable to agree upon a definitive rule governing
mid-ocean archipelagos and suggested that a subcommittee
40be established to deal with the problem.
Two delegations submitted formal proposals con-
cerning the regime for outlying groups of islands. The
41Yugoslavian proposal was premised upon amendment of
draft Article 10 governing islands, while the Philippine
42proposal approached the problem from the standpoint of
adding new language to the existing wording of draft
Article 5 on straight baselines, or, in the alternative,
amending Article 10 concerning islands. The two proposals
had several points in common. Each provided for use of
straight baselines drawn along the coast of the outermost
islands and provided that waters within the baselines
should be considered as internal. The Philippine proposal,
in addition, required that the islands should be sufficiently
close together to form a compact whole, that they should
have historically been considered collectively as a single
unit, and that the baselines should follow the general
configuration of the group.
45Neither of these proposals came to a vote. Thus,
today the closest thing to a regime covering mid-ocean
archipelagos is to be found in Articles 4(1) and 10(2) of
the Convention. However, it is clear from the wording of
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the former Article that it does not apply to groups of
islands which do not satisfy the geographical criteria
laid down therein, especially that portion referring to
"...islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity...",
while the latter cannot be considered controlling as it
entirely ignores the problem. Mid-ocean archipelagos are,
therefore, plainly not covered by these or any other
articles of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and it
remains an open question juridically as to how the terri-
torial sea is to be measured in the case of such island
44
groups.
Judicial Precedent The Judgment of the
Internati onal Court of Justic e in the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case
One can readily see from the foregoing that very
little in the way of guidance as to governing principles
of international lav/ concerning the territorial seas of
outlying archipelagos can be derived from the writings of
the publicists, the work of international lav/ conferences,
or existing conventional law. A more fruitful source of
guidance does exist, however, namely, the decision of the
International Court of Justice in the Anglo-Norwegian
45Fisheries Case, y which will now be examined.
The United Kingdom instituted the Fisheries Case
against Norway in 1949 objecting to the Norwegian delimita-
tion of her northern territorial waters as a result of a
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number of British trawlers being arrested and condemned by
Norwegian authorities for violations of Norwegian fisheries
zones. At issue, basically, was the validity under inter-
national law of the Norwegian delimitation system, estab-
lished by a Royal Decree of 12 July 1935, as amended by
a Decree of 10 December 1937, "by which a series of straight
baselines was laid down along the seaward projections of
the outermost components of the Norwegian coast a], archipe-
lago the skjaergaard. Pursuant to these decrees baselines
were drawn connecting 48 points, all varying in length, but
with at least 11 exceeding 18 miles in length, and one as
long as 44 mile's. In one case, the baseline was drawn to
46
a rock exposed at low tide.
At the .outset, it is important to note that the
four-mile width of the territorial sea claimed by Norway
was not at issue, in fact, the Norwegian claim in this
regard was conceded by the United Kingdom during the
47proceedings. Also, although the 1935 decree referred in
specific terms to fisheries zones only, the Court had no
doubt that it delimited what Norway conceived to be her
. .. . - 48territorial sea.
In summary, the principal legal issues raised by
the United Kingdom were that international law does not
permit individual states to arbitrarily choose the baselines
for their territorial waters; that territorial waters are
to be measured from the actual coastlines, that is, from
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the low-water mark on permanently dry land; and that de-
partures from the latter principles are strictly limited
49by international law. In opposition, Norway contended
that no general rule existed in international law requiring
"baselines to follow the coast throughout, and that, even
if such a rule did exist , it was not binding on Norway
since she had consistently refused to accept it, anl
finally, that international lav/ did not prohibit a state
from drawing straight baselines delimiting its territorial
50
waters from headland to headland.
The International Court's judgment, by a vote of
10 to 2, upheld the Norwegian straight baseline method
on the ground that it was part of a traditional system
which had been applied by Norway without protest to parts
of her coast since as early as 1812, and that this system
was, therefore, entitled to "...the benefit of general
51toleration.
That part of the Court's decision most material to
this study concerns itself with the locus of the problem.
In dealing with Norway's peculiar geographical problems
in delimiting her territorial seas, the Court stated:
"Where the coast is deeply indented and cut
into, as is that of Eastern Finmark, or
where it is bordered by an archipelago such
as the skjaergaard along the we stern sector
of the coast here in question, the baseline
becomes independent of the low-water mark';
and can only be determined by means of a
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geometric construction. In such circum-
stances the line of the low-water mark
can no longer he put forward as a rule
requiring the coast line to be followed
in all its sinuosities. Nor can one
characterize as exceptions to the rule
the very many derogations which would
he necessitated by such a rugged coast
;
the rule would disappear under the excep-
tions. Such a coast, viewed as a whole,
calls for the application of a different
method, that is, the method of baselines
which, within reasonable limits, may
depart from the physical line of the
coast. "52
The foregoing rule was, however, carefully circum-
scribed by the Court. Noting, in this connection, the
basic considerations inherent in the nature of the
territorial sea, the Court enunciated a number of criteria
to be used in applying straight baselines. Chief among
these were the following:
(1) "...the drawing of baselines must not
depart to any appreciable extent from
the general direction of , the coast."
(2) "The real question raised in the choice
of baselines is in effect whether
certain sea areas lying within these
lines are sufficiently closely linked
to the land domain as to be subject
to the regime of internal waters."
(3) "...there is one consideration not to
be overlooked—that of certain economic
interests peculiar to a region, the
reality and importance of which, are
clearly evidenced by long usage. "53
Above all, the Court stressed throughout Its
decision the importance of the exceptional geography of
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the Norwegian coast. In this regard it stated: "Since the
mainland is "bordered in its western sector "by the skjaergaard,
which constitutes a whole with the mainland, it is the outer
line of the skjaergaard which must he taken into account in
delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters. This
solution is dictated by geographical realities.'
Can these principles laid down by the Court in the
Fisheries Case be applied by analogy to outlying or mid-
ocean archipelagos, which in many respects, with the obvious
exception of the element of a continental mainland, present
geographical characteristics strikingly similar to those
considered by the Court in connection with its decision.
Although admitting that the decision in the Fisheries Case
is not binding, under Article 59 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, on other states, and that
the specific facts of a particular case before the Court
will always weigh heavily in its final decision, Mr.
55Evensen, m his article, expressed the view that the
International Court in its decision had spoken on broad
principles of international law applicable to the problem
56
of outlying archipelagos. Professor Sorenson, on the
other hand, is of the opinion that the Fisheries decision
had the practical effect of separating the problem of
coastal archipelagos from that of outlying or mid-ocean
groups. What had formerly been a controversial issue of
international lav; was, in his opinion, now decided by the
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Fisheries Case, "but only as to groups of islands in close
proximity to the mainland. He points out that, although
the Court referred to "groups of islands or coastal
archipelagos' 1 in very broad terms when it refuted the
British position, the geographical criteria, upon which
it relied in recognizing that a system of straight baselines
could be applied., were such that mid-ocean archipelagos
could hardly have been contemplated. As an example of this,
Professor Sorensen cites the condition laid down by the
Court stipulating that baselines "...must not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast,"
and concludes that this criterion obviously is inapplicable
to groups of islands located at some distance from the
mainland.
The views of both Jurists are clearly worthy of great
weight, as neither can be said to be entirely wrong in his
conclusions. Certainly, if not directly dispositive of the
issue, the Fisheries Case reasoning is most persuasive as
a source of authority for scholars evaluating the terri-
torial sea claims of island states. In this regard, Pro-
fessors McDougal and Burke, writing in their treatise,
Public Order of the Oceans
,
appear to be of the opinion
that the decision is fundamentally relevant to all straight
baseline problems, although obviously aimed with particular
57
emphasis at those of islands near a coast.

CHAPTER III
STATE PRACTICE — CLAIMS AND COUNTERCLAIMS
Claims Respecting the Territorial Seas of
Coastal Archipelagos and Dependent
Outlying Island Group s
A number of states, in some cases long before the
decision in the Fisheries Case, asserted the validity of
the straight baseline method of delimiting their respec-
tive territorial waters by means of unilateral state acts.
As indicated in the Evensen study of 1958, "the nations of
Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Yugoslavia, Saudi Ara-
bia, Egypt and Cuba employed straight baselines drawn along
the outermost points of their archipelagic coasts with the
waters enclosed within such lines considered as internal
58
waters. This practice, largely as a result of the
holding in the Fisheries Case, was ultimately codified in
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea arid the
Contiguous Zone under Article 4(1).
On the other hand, Mi1 . Evensen' s study also notes
that a number of the leading maritime nations, including
the United Kingdom and the United States, are opposed to
59this practice. Britain has, for the most part, main-
tained a rather strict posture with respect to delimiting
the territorial seas of her various insular dependencies,





waters. Jamaica offers the sole exception to this other-
wise strictly applied policy. With respect to Jamaican
waters, in 1864 the Lav/ Officers of the Crown held that:
"...in places where the possession of
particular rocks, reefs or banks,
naturally connected with the mainland
of any part of Her Majesty's terri-
tories, is necessary for the safe
occupation and defense of such main-
land, Her Majesty's Government also
claim the waters enclosed between the
mainland and those rocks, reefs or
banks; whatsoever may be the distance ,--,
between them and the nearest headland."
In line with the British, the United States has
been one of the leading proponents of the theory that
archipelagos, whether coastal or outlying, cannot be
treated in any different way from isolated islands as
far as the delimitation of territorial waters is concerned.
In the United States view, islands have their own territorial
seas, which may or may not coalesce with the territorial
CO
seas of the mainland or neighboring islands. Thus,
with regard to its insular territories, including the most
important, the State of Hawaii, the United States has
refrained from applying the archipelago concept of
delimitation, preferring instead to measure the territorial
sea of its archipelagos in the traditional fashion, from
the low-water mark on the coast of each island. This
principle was affirmed with respect to Hawaii in 1965 by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
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in its opinion in the case of Island Airlines, Inc. v.
Civil Aeronautics Board
,
in which it held that the Board
was entitled to an injunction against an airline flying
between the various Hawaiian Islands without the "benefit
of a Board certificate of public convenience and necessity
normally required for operation of an air carrier engaged
in interstate commerce. The Court refuted the airline's
contention that its flights between the various islands
were in reality intrastate flights because the channels
separating the islands are within the boundaries of the
State and constitute, therefore, territorial waters. It
found that neither Hawaii, as a monarchy, republic or
state, nor the United States had ever claimed the channel
waters as historic waters, and ruled that the airline's
operations were such that the aircraft, under the pre-
vailing regime of United States territorial waters, would
have to fly over the high seas between islands, thus
falling within the regulatory power of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board.
Claims of Archipelagic States
The Philippines
The Philippines was the first of the truly archi-
pelagic states to assert a comprehensive claim to competence
over the seas between and surrounding its component islands.
This was done initially in a note dated 12 December 1955
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from the Philippine Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Sec-
retary General of the United Nations announcing that:
"The position of the Philippine Government
in the matter is that all waters around,
between and connecting the different is-
lands "belonging to the Philippine Archipe-
lago irrespective of their widths or
dimensions, are necessary appurtenances
of its land territory, forming an. integral
part of the national or inland waters,
subject to the exclusive sovereignty of
the Philippines. Ail other water areas
embraced in the imaginary lines described
in the Treaty of Paris of December 10,
1898..., the treaty concluded at Washington,
D. C, between the United States and Spain
on November 7? 1900..., and the Agreement
of January 2, 1930 between the United States
and the_ United Kingdom. . .
,
and the Convention
of July 6, 1932 between the United States and
Great Britain. .
.
, as reproduced in Section
6 of Act No. ^003 and Article I of the
Philippine Constitution, are considered
as maritime territorial waters of the
Philippines for the purposes of protection
of our fishing rights, conservation of our
fishing resources, enforcement of revenue
and anti-smuggling laws, defense and
security, etc.
"
"It is the view of our Government that
there is no rule of international law
which defines or regulates the extent
of the inland waters of a State."
During the eighth session of the International Law
Commission's conference on the regime of the territorial
sea, the Philippines reiterated its position in another
note verb ale dated 20 January 1956 to the Secretary General.
This note was identical in language to that of 12 December
1933? with the exception of the following additional proviso
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"...and protection of such other interests
as the Philippines may deem vital to its
national welfare and security, without
prejudice to the exercise by friendly
foreign vessels of the right of innocent
passage over those waters. All natural
deposits or occurrences of petroleum or
natural gas in public and/or private
lands within the territorial, waters or
on the continental shelf, or its analogue
in an archipelago, seaward from the shores
of the Philippines, which are not within
the territories of other countries, be-
long inalienably and impre scriptibly to
the Philippines, subject to the right of
innocent passage of ships of friendly
foreign States over those waters."
This sweeping claim covers vast areas of the western
Pacific and of the South China Sea in addition to numerous
lesser bodies of water more or less surrounded by the
Philippine Islands. The largest of these enclosed waters,
66the Sulu Sea, covers an area of 86,000 square miles.
(For a graphic illustration of the scope of the Philippine
claim, see Appendix A)
During the Second United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, the chief of the Philippine delegation, Mr.
Arturo Tolentino, in a statement to the assembled delegates,
explained the juridical and historical bases of his govern-
ment's claim. He pointed out that the Treaty of Paris of
10 December Q-989^ whereby the Philippines was ceded by
Spain to the United States, spoke not only in terms of the
archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, but, more
importantly, in terms of certain metes and bounds indicating

- 30 -
by longitude and latitude the boundaries of the territory ceded,
Mr. Tolentino stressed also that this method of delimiting the
Philippine archipelago was also employed by Spain and the
United States in a supplementary treaty of cession in 1900,
and in 1930 in a treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom concerning the boundary between the Philip-
th
69
68pines and North Borneo. Finally he pointed out that e
Philippine Constitution of 8 February 1935 •> as amended,
in Article I specifically defines the national territory
of the Philippines by reference to the aforementioned
treaties. The absence of any protest by other nations
against the exercise of sovereignty, first by the United
States, then by the Philippines, over the territory em-
braced by these various treaties and the Philippine Con-
stitution operated, in Mr. Tolentino' s view, to give the
Philippines both a legal and historic basis for its claim.
By way of further argument in support of his nation's
claim, Mr. Tolentino declared that due to considerations of
geography and economics, " all of the waters of the Philippine
archipelago, regardless of their width or dimensions, have
always been regarded as necessary appurtenances of the land
territory, forming part of the inland waters of the
Philippines. The largest of these inland waters, the
Sulu Sea with a total surface area of about 86,000 square
miles, he noted was insignificant as compared, for example,
to Hudson Bay with its 500,000 square miles, which Canada
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claims as part of its national waters under historic title. 7°
The Congress of the Philippines eventually forma-
lized the nation's claim by enacting Republic Act 304-6 of
71June 17, 1961, which provides for a system of straight
baselines joining appropriate points on the outermost is-
lands of the group. The waters enclosed within these base-
lines, covering an area of 328,34-5 square miles, 72 are
considered internal, while those beyond the baselines, but
within the limits of the boundaries established by treaty,
covering an additional 258,515 square miles, 73 are considered
as territorial waters. Simple arithmatic shows, therefore,
that, by virtue 'of her claim, the Philippines, which
possesses 115,600 square miles of land territory, has
increased her total area to 702,4-60 square miles, or by
more than a factor of six.
Indonesia
The government of Indonesia was not long in following
the Philippine example. In fact, its claim clearly resembles
that of the Philippines, and the use of identical terms in
its assertion is striking. On 14- December 1957, it issued
a declaration concerning the territorial waters of the
Indonesian Republic, which, in pertinent part, stated:
"Historically, the Indonesian archipelago
has been .an entity since time immemorial..
In view of territorial entirety ard of
preserving the wealth of the Indonesian
state, it is deemed necessary to consider
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all waters "between the islands an entire
entity. On the ground of the above con-
siderations, the Government states that
all waters around, "between arid connecting
the islands or parts of islands "belonging
to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective
of their width or dimension are natural
appurtenances of its land territory and
therefore an integral part of the inland
or national waters subject to the absolute
sovereignty of Indonesia. The peaceful
passage of foreign vessels through these
waters is guaranteed as long and insofar
as it is not contrary to the sovereignty
of the Indonesian state or harmful to
her security. The delimitation of the
territorial sea, with a width of 12
nautical miles, shall be measured from
straight baselines connecting the outer-
most points ofnthe islands of the Republic
of Indonesia."'
The broad outlines of the foregoing announcement
were laid down with specificity in legislation enacted in
75I960. In 1962, an ordinance governing peaceful passage
in Indonesian waters was enacted. It basically guaranteed
the right of innocent passage of foreign vessels through
internal waters, which, prior to the claim announced in
1957 and the legislation of I960, had constituted high
seas or territorial waters. Bays, inlets, and estuaries
of less than 24 nautical miles width are exempted. Foreign
fishing vessels are required to transit internal waters
along sealanes determined by the Indonesian Navy and to
keep their fishing gear packed and stowed while in In-
donesian territorial seas and internal waters. Foreign
men of war and government vessels are required to obtain
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the prior approval of the Indonesian Navy for any transit
of Indonesian waters; submarines are required to sail on
76the surface at all times.
Mr. Achmad Subardjo, chairman of the Indonesian
delegation to the United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1958, spoke in defense of his country's
claim during the general debate. He asserted that the
traditional approach of measuring the territorial sea
from the low-water mark was "based on the assumption that
the coastal state was continental in nature. Such a sys-
tem could not be applied without harmful effects to archi-
pelagic states. As in the case of Indonesia, consisting of
some 13,000 islands scattered over a vast area, treating
each island as a separate entity with its own territorial
waters would create serious problems with regard to com-
77
munications and the effective exercise of state jurisdiction. '
In an explanatory memorandum accompanying the Act of i960,
the Indonesian government buttressed its claim by referring
to the governmental need for homogeneity of territory for
purposes of communications, jurisdiction and security.
In the field of economics, the memorandum noted that the
effect of the Act would be to vest Indonesia not only with
sovereignty over all waters enclosed within the boundaries
of the territorial sea, but over the superjacent airspace
and subjacent sea-bottom and subsoil as well. Thef dependence
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of the Indonesian populace on the sea as an important source
of protein was also observed, and the protection of this
resource, particularly in view of the primitive nature of
the Indonesian fishing industry, was asserted as another
justification for the nation's claim. 78 (For a graphic
illustration of the scope of the Indonesian claim, see
Appendix B)
The Maldive Islands
The most recent claim to delimitation of territorial
seas by application of the archipelago concept, that of the
Republic of Maldives, was largely unnoticed by the world
community when initially promulgated in 1964, when the
territory of the then self-governing British protectorate
of the Maldives. was defined in its constitution as includ-
ing the islands, sea and air surrounding and in between the
islands situated within certain stated coordinates.'79
This lack of notoriety is understandable consider-
ing the relative isolation, of the Maldives, lying as they
do some 400 miles to the southeast of Ceylon, consisting of
about 2,000 low-lying coral islands totalling about 115
square miles in area, and inhabited by only 96,432
persons. However, the vast scope of the Maldivian claim
was finally brought to the world's attention in 1970 when
the Republic of Maldives government began, through diplomatic
channels, to protest incursions into her claimed territorial

waters and exclusive fishing zone by foreign fishing ves-
i 81sels.
At this time it was learned that contrary to the
general belief that the Maldives claimed a 12-mile terri-
torial sea drawn from the normal baselines of each island,
the Republic of Maldives was in fact claiming as territorial
seas an area of the Indian Ocean totalling some 37,000
op
square miles lying between Latitudes 7° 9^' North and
0° H$W South, and Longitudes 72° 30/2 ' East and 73° 4-8
'
East. y In addition to this expansive territorial sea
claim, the Maldives in 1969 and 1970 established a fishing
territory covering an additional 113,000 square nautical
miles bounded by coordinates running beyond and essentially
84- /parallel to those delimiting the territorial sea. (For
a graphic illustration of the scope of the Maldivian claim,
see Appendix C)
As is obvious from an examination of Appendix C, the
territorial sea claimed by the Maldives is unique not only
with regard to its disproportionate size in relation to the
land area concerned, but in its utter lack of any logical
relation to territorial baselines. In this respect, it is
most closely related to the Philippine claim. Although the
bases for the Maldivian claim have not been enunciated by
the claimant, inasmuch as the economy of the Maldives is
based almost exclusively on fishing, with dried benito the
main export commodity, it would be safe to assume that
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it is motivated primarily "by a desire to prevent competition
between poorly equipped Maldivian fishermen and more modern
foreign fishing fleets.
The Counterclaim and Resulting Protests Against
Unilateral Acts of Delimitation
Briefly put, the main response to claims to delimit
the territorial sea by means of lines connecting the outer-
most islands of a group, thereby including all waters within
such lines as internal waters, has been that islands in an
archipelago are no different than other islands, therefore,
each should have its own distinct belt of territorial sea.
The count erclaimants deny the admissibility of applying
straight baselines and designating enclosed waters as
internal.
The principal count erclaimants , the great maritime
nations, such as Great Britain, the United States, the
Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries, Australia and
Japan, reacted strongly to the claims of the Philippines
and Indonesia.
The United States' attitude toward the Philippine
claim, insofar as it was based on treaty boundaries, was
that the lines referred to in bilateral treaties between
the United States and Great Britain and Spain were in-
tended merely to delimit the region v/ithin which certain
land areas were to belong to the Philippines and that
they were not in any sense intended as boundary lines.
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In 1958, the "United States government stated that it recog-
nized only a three-mile territorial sea for each of the
Philippine islands.
When the chief of the Philippine delegation to
the I960 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea was
heard to have informed the press that failure by any
country represented at the Conference, including the
United States, to register protest to the Philippine
position constituted tacit recognition of his country's
00
claim, ' the United States Department of State hastened
to draw attention to pertinent parts of the address
delivered to the Conference by the United States delegate,
Arthur H. Dean, to the effect that "...its [the United
States'] silence was not to be construed in any way as
acquiescence in any views stated at the Conference which
were inconsistent with the official position of the United
89States Government..." Upon approval of Republic Act
3046 by the Philippine government on 18 May 1961, the
United States registered its protest by means of an em-
bassy note declaring, inter alia
,
that it could not
regard as binding upon it or its nationals, any claims
90based upon the said Act.
The Indonesian claim of lz! December 1957 evoked
even swifter response from maritime states. On 31
December, the United States Embassy delivered a note of
91protest to the Indonesian Foreign Office. The Japanese
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government on 1$ January 1958 likewise addressed a com-
munication to the Indonesian government protesting that
government's claim and asserting that its validity could
92
not be admitted under established international law. An
announcement was issued on 15 January 1958 by the government
of Australia stating that it would not recognize or be
bound by Indonesia's announced claim to sovereignty over
93the Java Sea and its superjacent airspace.
It is interesting to note that of the major mari-
time states, only Russia came out unequivocally in favor
of the Indonesian claim v/hich it considered to be fully in
94-
accord with the rules of international law. Also of some
interest is the fact that the claim of the Philippines was
not received with nearly as much protest or criticism as that
of Indonesia. This is, perhaps, due to the central geo-
graphical position of the Indonesian archipelago athwart
sealanes that are considered to be more critical than
95those traversing Philippine waters. The same rationale
no doubt explains the relative lack of controversy over
the claim of the Maldives. In any case, the United States
government registered its protest to the Maldivian claim
in an aide memoire forwarded by the American Embassy in
96Colombo, Ceylon, during the first week of June, 1970.
Eases of the Counterclaim
Probably the main consideration invoked against
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the application of the straight baseline system to outlying
archipelagos is the legal status of the waters enclosed by
such baselines. It has been generally assumed, both in
practice as well as in connection with many of the pro-
posed rules discussed, that such enclosed waters should
have the status of internal waters. As the outstanding
legal feature of internal waters is the complete sovereignty
which a state exercises over them, in effect as complete
as it may exercise over its land territory and including
97the right of exclusion of foreign vessels, the archipe-
lagic system of delimitation flies directly in the face of
the time-honore'd doctrine of the freedom of the seas.
The official position of the United States is
that there is no justification in international law for
the application of straight baselines as advocated by the
archipelagic states. Each island is considered as having
its own normal baselines and, where such islands are
sufficiently close together their territorial seas may
coalesce and form a continuous zone of territorial waters.
Otherwise, absent such coalescence, all intervening waters
98
are to be viewed as high seas.
Arthur H. Dean illustrated the position of the
United States very vividly by referring to the circumnavi-
gation of the globe by the nuclear submarine TRITON in I960.
During the course of her voyage, TRITON passed submerged
through the Surigao Strait south of Luzon, the Mindanao
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Sea, The Macassar Strait, the Java Sea and. into the Indian
Ocean. Dean pointed out that much of the waters traversed
"by TRITON during this part of her voyage are claimed uni-
laterally by the Philippines and Indonesia as internal waters,
99
although they include vast stretches of what is high seas.
Thus, had the unilateral claims of Indonesia and the Philip-
pines to the waters within the respective archipelagos as
internal waters been recognized or considered as established
in international law by the United States, the voyage of the
TRITON would have been impossible without the prior permission
of the states concerned.
Speaking from the British point of view, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice approached the problem from an appealingly simple
standpoint. In his view, Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
which provides that "the territorial sea of an island is
measured in accordance with the provisions of these
articles," " would seem to imply the fact that the
Convention had resolved the question of outlying groups
of islands by simply not providing any special system for
delimiting the territorial seas of such groups on any
"group basis." According to this provision of the
Convention, in Sir Gerald's view, where there is an
island group, each unit thereof has its own territorial
sea measured around it in the ordinary way. Should,
however, individual islands be sufficiently close together,

- 41 -
their territorial seas will overlap and a fairly compact
stretch of water will be created constituting a sort of
bloc of territorial sea. Conversely, if there is no over-
lap due to wide separation of the component islands, the
waters between the resulting areas of territorial sea
will partake of the nature of high seas. Fitzmaurice is
convinced that the foregoing represents general interna-
tional law as it now stands, despite the claims of the
archipelagic states. As to such claims, in his view, except
where the island group in question is really compact, there
is the potential for great abuse, particularly where
enclosed waters" are deemed internal. His interpretation
of the Convention, the "overlap theory," on the other
hand, would obviate this difficulty, as enclosed waters
102
would consist of territorial as opposed to internal waters.
This approach has the benefit of simplicity and would ob-
viously suit both the exclusive and inclusive interests of
states such as the United States, Great Britain and Japan,
which lie in preservation of freedom of navigation. It
has, however, been clearly rejected by the archipelago
nations. The solution to the controversy, therefore, lies
obviously not in pressing traditional concepts upon such
nations, however inclusive in scope and effect, but in
devising an. accommodation that will effectively protect
their legitimate special interests as well as the--more




THE CONTROVERSY IN PERSPECTIVE
The Geographical Context
The Philippines
The Philippines occupies an archipelago composed
of an estimated 7,100 islands, of which about 880 are in-
habited. Its total land area of 115,708 square miles is
slightly smaller than that of the British Isles, however,
due to its extensive fragmentation, the Philippines has
a coastline nearly equal in length to that of the United
105States. Located off the coast of Southeast Asia, the
Philippines is closely related geologically to the dis-
continuous chain of islands stretching from Sakhalin,
through Japan, Taiwan and on through the Indonesian
archipelago. In fact, the Philippines shares a common
104-
contmental shelf, or submarine platform, with Indonesia.
The dimensions of the Philippine group are imposing, ex-
tending over 1,000 miles on its north-south axis, and
105
over 600 miles east to west.
This vast expanse of island studded sea lies
astride many important sealanes. Convenient east-west
sea traffic is dependent upon passage through straits
between certain islands of the Philippine group. ^ Chief




eastern Luzon from northwestern Samar and forming one of
the main routes between the Pacific Ocean and the China
Sea, and Surigao Strait separating southern Leyte
from northern Mindanao and connecting the Pacific Ocean
107
with the waters of the Mindanao, Sulu and China Seas.
The Philippines also occupies a critical geographi-
cal position with respect to international air traffic. It
lies at the junction of long-distance air routes connecting
Asia, the United States, Australia and the Western Pacific.
As a result, Manila airport has become one of the three
most important in Southeast Asia.
Indonesia
The territorial base of the Republic of Indonesia
109
consists of the largest archipelago m the world. In
all, the country consists of some 13,000 islands totalling
736,469 square miles in surface area. The extremes of the
archipelago are separated by more than 2,500 miles from
east to west and 1,250 miles from north to south. In-
donesia forms a discontinuous land bridge between the
continents of Asia and Australia, with the major gaps
between the land portions of the bridge, such as the
Malacca, Sunda and Macassar Straits, connecting major
east-west sealanes. The strategic importance of
Indonesia stems from this bridge-like morphology and the
fact that it is surrounded by some of the most important
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waters of Asia. The Indonesian archipelago is bordered on
the east "by the Pacific and in the west by the Indian Ocean.
The Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea separate it
in the north from the Asian mainland, while in the south the
Indian Ocean and the Arafura Sea separate it from Australia.
The commercial and maritime significance of Indonesia is
particularly affected by the many lines of world communi-
cation that pass through its waters and become concentrated
at a few important straits.
The Maldive Islands
The land territory of the Republic of Maldives con-
sists of a chain of twelve low-lying coral reefs covering a
total area of 115 square miles. The chain extends 550 miles
from north to south between lattitudes 7° 6' north and 0°
42' south. The nearest significant land mass is Ceylon,
112
which lies about 450 miles to the northeast.
The Maldives are probably most remarkable for their
lack of notoriety. Major international sea and airlanes
are far removed from the group. However, the Indian Ocean,
in which the Maldives occupy a central position, has in
recent years become an arena of increasing naval competi-
tion between the Soviet Union and the United States. This
competition was sparked by Great Britain's decision in 1968
to relinquish its traditional role of peace-keeper in the
area and to withdraw its military forces from their posi-
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115 ...tions east of the Suez Canal. As Britain withdrew its
forces, the Soviet Union progressively expanded its naval
presence in the Indian Ocean. By 1970, certain American
military analysts began to regard the Soviet -Navy as the
paramount power in the region "by virtue of its maintaining
between six and fifteen v/arships in the area and engaging
114in frequent maneuvers and portcalls. In December 1970,
in an apparent effort to counter the growing Soviet presence,
the United States and Britain announced the planned con-
struction of a joint air and radio communications base on
Diego Garcia Island in the Chagos Archipelago, which is
located to the south of the Maldives, for the purpose of
monitoring the activities of the Soviet Indian Ocean
fleet. 115
The Maldives are, willingly or not, caught up in
this evolving international competition, not only because
of their geographical location, but because of the presence
on the Maldivian island of Gan of a British military air-
116field. How this struggle will eventually affect the
Maldives is difficult to say at this juncture, but it is
clear that the strategic importance of the islands is bound
to increase with the intensity of the competition for naval
supremacy in the area.
The Historical Context x
An understanding of the motivation for pressing

- 46
expansive claims as those espoused by the Philippines,
Indonesia and the Maldives can only be achieved by an
awareness of the historical setting in which they were
made. In all three instances, unilateral acts of delimi-
tation in accordance with the archipelago concept were
closely related in time to the achievement of national
independence. In the case of the Philippines, indepen-
117dence was won in 1946 ' and the claim followed in
1955. Indonesia became a sovereign state in 1949
120
and asserted her claim in 1957- The Republic of
Maldives, as a self-governing British protectorate made
121its claim in 1964, one year prior to Britain's grant
122
of full independence.
In point of time, the claims of the Philippines
and Indonesia also form part of the plethora of claims
typified by those of Chile, Ecuador and Peru to ever
widening competence over adjacent waters that followed in
the wake of the Truman Proclamation on the Continental
123Shelf of 1945. As "new" or emerging states, there-
fore, it is clear that the claimants in the archipelago
problem, are reluctant to accept as binding those rules
of international lav/ relating to the delimitation of
124lslands created before they attained statehood. " This
attitude must be taken fully into account if a regime for
archipelagic waters mutually satisfactory to coastal as
well as world community interests is ever to be devised.
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The Exclusive Interests of the Claimants
The seas surrounding and adjacent to archipelagos
provide almost laboratory conditions for observation of the
competing and frequently conflicting interests of coastal
as against other states. It is only natural that out of
this welter of opposing demands and expectations, the most
intense concentration of interests and concommitant expec-
tations should "be found in the coastal, or archipelagic
state. Such coastal interests include primarily the nor-
mally accepted demands for power, encompassing factors
such as access to territorial bases of power, defense,
and exercise of police power in adjacent waters; for
wealth, which includes control over access to and dispo-
sition of resources, as well as protection of the wealth
producing processes; for well-being, under which may be
enumerated resource controls, inspection procedures and
sanitation and pollution controls; and for enlightenment,
...
. . 125
which covers activities such as scientific research.
Other base values, such as rectitude, affection, skill
and respect, with the possible exception of the latter-
two, seem to play less of a role in the formulation of
coastal interests. Respect, of course, may, to some
extent, be hoped for, if not realized, in extending a
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state's territorial sea domain, while skill as a value
could possibly "be affected in terms of improved resource
exploitation and fishing technology "brought about as a
side effect of obtaining a monopoly in certain waters.
However, considering the fact that the archipelago
states share in common the status of under-developed or
developing countries, it is doubtful that without outside
assistance they would be capable of effective measures
toward maximizing the development of skill in their ad-
jacent seas, at least not in the forseeable future.
In a practical sense, the most relevant factor
affecting the concentration of exclusive coastal interests
is the geographical reality of archipelagic states being
composed of a group or groups of islands separated by ex-
panses of water of varying dimensions. Geography, there-
fore, acts to further narrow the concentration of exclusive
coastal interests in the case of archipelago nations. Thus,
such states face common problems in the areas of transporta-
tion and communications, military security and control over
access to fisheries and other ocean resources, all of which
125
are greatly complicated by their geographical situation.
In this connection, Ylx. Tolentino, speaking for the
Philippine delegation at the Second United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea during I960, summarized his government's




"First, the security of the State demands
that it should have exclusive possession
of its shores and that it should be able
to protect its approaches.
"Second, for the purpose of furthering its
commercial, fiscal and political interests,
a state must be able to supervise all
ships entering, leaving or anchoring in
the sea near its coast.
"Third, the exclusive enjoyment of the
products of the sea close to the shores
of a State is necessary for the existence
and welfare-, g£ the people and the land
territory." '
Obviously, travel and commerce between the different
regions of archipelagic states must rely in large measure
upon the use of sea transportation. This dependence upon
the oceans for communications and travel has played no small
part in prompting expansive territorial sea claims by states
such as Indonesia, the Philippines and the Maldives. Such
states view the delimitation of their territorial waters as
an altogether different proposition than delimitation with
respect to continental coasts. They reject the application
of the traditional rules on the ground that the effect of
their application would be the disintegration of the state.
The continuity of the government's jurisdiction and authority
would in their opinion be destroyed by the vast areas of
high seas that would divide the land territory of the state
1 OR
if the low-water mark rule were to be applied. c There is,
therefore, valid reason for concern on the part of the island
}
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nations, who share the common problem of effectively im-
plementing local policy with respect to such vital matters
as immigration, entry of aliens and import-export controls,
129
under the circumstances of their peculiar geography.
In the case of the Philippines the severity of the problem
is illustrated by the currently contained, but long-smoldering
insurgency of the communist -inspired Hukbalahup movement
,
which could potentially receive external support and en-
couragment through clandestine infiltration of the lengthy
130
and difficult-to guard Philippine coastline. Another
problem of government related to the delimitation con-
troversy is that of smuggling. The Philippines in parti-
cular has struggled with this problem since independence,
131but unfortunately with little success. Indonesia like-
wise suffers lost revenue from the activities of smugglers,
in fact, in certain areas, it is estimated that smuggling
132far exceeds m volume the flow of legitimate commerce.
133 . 134-Both the Philippines and Indonesia have problems of
cultural and linguistic, as well as geographical unity. In
Indonesia, the internal conflict between the island of Java
and the outlying territories over the former's dominance
within the government led to an abortive rebellion during
1351958. The Philippines, likewise, is faced with
regionalism with the island of Luzon occupying the preeminent
position over the centrally located Visayas and Mindanao
1%
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to the south. Inter-regional frictions are not believed
to be such, however, as to lead to sectional conflict as
experienced by Indonesia, although the possibility cannot
. . 136be altogether excluded by responsible authorities.
National security in the sense of defense against
external threats is also rendered more difficult by the
basic configuration of the archipelagic state. The ocean
areas and coastlines involved are generally so vast, par-
ticularly in light of available military resources, as to
make illicit access for the purposes of infiltration or
espionage, on the one hand, extremely difficult for coastal
authorities to prevent or control, and on the other, rela-
157tively easy for those posing the threat to accomplish. ^'
In this connection, the Filippino jurist, Coquia, notes the
vulnerability of his country to incursions by foreign naval
vessels and its lack of power to drive such forces out,
citing by way of illustration of the problem the activities
of the Imperial Japanese fleet and the ease with which it
was able to invade Philippine waters and to occupy the
138islands during World War II.
Concern for security was also articulated by
Indonesian authorities in the explanatory memorandum ac-
139
companying Act No. 4- of I960, in which fear was expressed
for the safety of the state in the event, not so much of
a war involving Indonesia directly as a combatant, but of
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a conflict between foreign naval powers, whose operations
in and around Indonesian, waters could well jeopardize na-
tional unity by disrupting lines of communication and
commerce. Particular stress was placed on the danger of
the consequences to the inhabitants of the islands in the
event of naval battles involving nuclear weapons.
The third major exclusive coastal interest of
archipelagic states lies in the appropriation of surround-
ing waters as a source of food and other resources. Both
14-0 14-1
the Philippines and Indonesia rely heavily upon fish
as a source of animal protein in their national diets, while
the Maldivian economy is almost totally dependent upon the
fishing industry for its main export commodity — dried
14-2fish. As emerging nations faced with the problems
engendered by ever-increasing population pressure, In-
donesia and the Philippines in particular have felt an
urgent need to reserve for themselves the ocean resources
of their adjacent waters. This sense of urgency is
compounded by the primitive nature of the fishing industry
in these states and its inability to compete with the larger,
more efficient deep sea fishing boats of other nations,
which it is felt, if permitted to operate locally, would
14-
5
deprive the local populace of a basic source of livelihood.
No one can deny the legitimacy of any of the
exclusive interests discussed above. Viewed from ^he
perspectives of the claimant states, each, standing alone
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or with the others, appears to be of such vital importance
to the state as to furnish ample justification for unilateral
action designed for its protection and furtherance. If the
matter could "be left at that, no real problem would exist.
However, these coastal interests do not exist in a vacuum,
and the pattern of controversy becomes more clear when we
add to the claims of the archipelago nations the counter-
vailing demands and expectations of other states and the
general community.
The Community Interest
Standing in opposition to the exclusive demands of
island nations to maximum jurisdiction and control over travel
and communications, military security and the natural resources
of their adjacent ocean areas, are the equally legitimate
inclusive interests of the general community of states. Fore-
most among these is the concept of the freedom of the seas,
which embraces primarily free and unhampered access for all
to transportation and communication on the high seas, whether
surface, subsurface or aerial. The general community, no
less than the claimants, has an interest in the resources
contained in the waters surrounding archipelagos in the
sense of an inclusive demand for the shared use of their
biological resources. Population pressure and hunger are
obviously not phenomena peculiar to Indonesia and "the
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Philippines. Much of the rest of the world also must look
to the seas as a vast renewable reservoir of food. Mari-
time states, in addition, share a further interest in
common, namely that of having their national law apply to
144persons and events on board their flagships.
The community interest in transportation is es-
pecially affected "by the fact that transit "between the
islands of, or through straits controlled by, archipelagic
states may be the most convenient, if not the only, route
between certain points on a voyage. Both with regard to
air and sea transport, detours around an entire archipelago
would result in significant deviation from, and lengthening
of, traditional routes. Obviously, the intensity of the
general community interest with regard to transportation
will tend to vary in proportion to the location of the
archipelago in question and the importance of its waters
145
and straits for navigational purposes. Thus, protests
by maritime states were, perhaps, most vehement against
Indonesia's claim, considering the strategic importance of
waterways such as the Macassar, Molucca and Sunda Straits,
14-6
which were thereby affected. The Philippine claim, on
the other hand, as we have seen, met with somewhat less
. . 147
opposition, while that of the Maldives, perhaps because
of the relative isolation of that state, has evoked only
148
relatively mild reaction from other states.
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The risks to international shipping and communi-
cations posed "by declaring archipelagic waters to "be in-
ternal waters, through which there is no right of innocent
passage, are amply illustrated "by the truly vast areas
of water involved in the three claims under discussion which
could theoretically be closed to foreign shipping at the
discretion of the coastal authorities. Although Indonesia
has by statute enacted an exception to this rule, permitting
innocent passage of foreign vessels through its claimed
150internal waters, y nevertheless, the concession was clearly
made as a matter of grace and not in recognition of the
151 . ...
rights of other states. The position of the Philippines
152is not quite as clear m this regard. Republic Act 3046
does not address itself at all to the question of innocent
155passage, however, the Philippine note verbal
e
of 12
December 1956, which was delivered to the Secretary
General during the eighth session of the International
Law Commission's conference on the regime of the territorial
sea, in restating the basic Philippine territorial sea
claim, purported to reserve to ships of friendly foreign
154
nations the right of innocent passage. It is also
interesting to note that were the claims in question
less comprehensive in scope, that is, only to regard the
areas enclosed within the archipelagic baselines as
territorial rather than internal waters, international air
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and sea transport would, nevertheless, still face the
potential of serious disruption. Were this the case,
sea transport would still be denied the absolute freedom
of the high seas it formerly enjoyed, as it could proceed
only by virtue of the somewhat nebulous right of innocent
passage at the unilateral pleasure of the coastal state.
Air traffic would be even more seriously affected, as air-
craft may not overfly the territorial sea of another state
155m the absence of a special treaty or agreement . "^
With respect to fisheries, there is an equally
serious potential for deprivation of community use inherent
in typical archipelago claims, which tend to close extensive
areas to community exploitation. The rationale of the claim-
ants seems to be that exclusion of foreign fishermen will
tend to conserve available resources for their own fishing
industries and populations. The reliance of the coastal
states on fishing as a source of food has been clearly
156demonstrated, however, it is questionable whether, m
view of the backwardness of local fishing technology, full
utilization of available resources is even remotely ap-
157proached by the typical archipelago state.
The primary value inherent in exclusive coastal
claims, as well the general community's interest in
fishery resources is the well-being of human beings. The
coastal state, of course, has a duty to act effectively

- 57 -
to promote the well-being, in terms of the health and
nourishment, of its population. At the same time, the
world community is faced with the overwhelming problem
of feeding a population growing at an astronomical rate.
Experts agree that the oceans constitute an almost in-
exhaustible source of high quality proteins, fat and
carbohydrate, all of which are essential to the maintenance
158
of health m human beings. Although it is generally
believed that tropical waters are less favorable hydro-
graphically for the production of dense fish stocks,
recent developments indicate that their potential is much
greater than was formerly believed. Recent investigations
also show that in the waters material to this study —
those of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, few of the
159
existing fisheries are even partially exploited. It
stands to reason that fish not caught are essentially fish
wasted. In a region of the world inhabited by at least
half of the earth's population, most of it sorely deprived
of essential foodstuffs, the preeminence of the community
interest in shared exploitation of the animal resources of





The Effect of an Absence of Generally Accepted
Legal Doctrine
i
Concerning Delimitation o f the
Territorial Sea of Outlying Archipelagos
It is clear that at the present time there is no
agreement among states with respect to rules or norms pre-
scribing any particular system of delimiting the territo-
rial waters of outlying island groups. Nevertheless,
this cannot be taken as meaning that states are at liberty
to unilaterally adopt whatever methods they may prefer,
especially in light of that portion of the decision in
the Fisheries Case stating that:
"The delimitation of sea areas has always an
international law aspect ; it cannot be de-
pendent merely upon the law of the coastal
State as expressed in its municipal law.
Although it is true that the act of
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral
act, because only the coastal State is
competent to undertake it, the validity
of the delimitation with regard to other
States depends upon international law. ,! l°l
If one concedes the absence of any generally
accepted rules or norms specifically prescribing a method
or system of delimitation for outlying island groups, and




Justice that the validity of any "unilateral act of deli-
mitation depends upon international lav/, the question
immediately arises upon what doctrines or principles
of international lav/ does this validity depend? As we
have seen, no generally accepted system or method exists,
"but that is not to say that no legal solution to the
problem is available, as there is ample precedent in
international law for judicial treatment of difficult
problems of this kind.
While the International Court of Justice normally
formulates its decisions on the basis of existing rules
or principles of law, the sources of which are enumerated
in Article 38 of the Court's Statute, in some cases of
apparent novelty the Court has rendered decisions on the
very ground that there did not exist any generally ac-
cepted rules of international law applicable to the
factual situation before it. Two significant examples of
such decisions are to be found in the Fisheries Case and
in the Court's advisory opinion on Reservations to the
Genocide Convention, ' in both of which the Court pro-
ceeded on the theory that since there was no generally
accepted rule of lav/ governing the issue before it , it
was entitled to proceed with an independent examination
165
and solution of the problems involved. ^ Professor
Sorensen, in his excellent article on the archipelago
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problem, " adopts the position that the criteria established
in Article LV of the Territorial Seas Convention concerning
the application of straight "baselines to coastal regions
are such that an international tribunal might be able, by
analogy to Article 4-, to arrive at a concrete decision on
the archipelago problem. He regards an extended acceptance
of compulsory adjudication by the states concerned as the
only alternative to the dilemna created by the failure of
the international community to arrive at a satisfactory
agreement on the subject. While Mr. Sorensen's analysis
of the situation is no doubt well founded, his proposed
solution is essentially negative in approach. To leave
a solution to the judicial process requires the expenditure
of time — time in which an appropriate case or contro-
versy suitable for adjudication can arise, be framed for
presentation, and then tried. Such an approach also pre-
supposes a willingness on the part of states to litigate
the issues, something that obviously cannot be assumed.
The goal of achieving and maintaining a workable system
of public order for the oceans is too important to leave
the problem to the uncertainties of such a negative and
time-consuming approach. A positive approach to solution
of the problem is, therefore, obviously demanded by the
realities of the situation and can be found most effectively
through a continuation of past efforts at codification.
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This study, accordingly, will go on to evaluate the claims
of archipelagic states to delimit their territorial seas
in accordance with the so-called archipelago concept in
the light of existing law relevant to the problem, and
then to propose a possible approach for its solution.
The absence of generally accepted law governing
the archipelago problem leaves one further area for com-
ment, namely, the risk, inherent in allowing such a gap
in the lav/ to persist, of existing claims, such as those
of Indonesia, the Philippines and the Maldives, becoming
at some future time established through customary inter-
national law.
The elements necessary in general for the maturing
of customary international law have been stated to be:
"...the concordant and recurring action of numerous States
in the domain of international relations, the conception
in each case that such action was enjoined by law, and
the failure of other States to challenge that conception
165
at the time." Put another way, the technical require-
ments for establishing a rule of customary international
law encompass two essential elements — a material element
in certain past uniformities of conduct, and a psychological
element, or opinio juris
,
involving a certain moral "ought-
ness", ascribable to such past conduct. With regard to
claims such as those at issue here, that is, where a special
right at variance with the ordinary rules normally applicable
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is advanced, Sir Gerald Fit zmaurice emphasizes the necessity
of consent, or more appropriately, acquiescence, on the
167part of other states. Such consent or acquiescence
need not amount to formal or specific approval, and is
more appropriately described as "a yielding to principle",
or to the logical applications thereof resulting in deep-
rooted and approved practices. An absence of objection to
such recurrent practices or to claims to apply legal
principles in a certain way may give rise to an inference
of such yielding or acquiescence. It has been stated
in connection with the failure to make appropriate objec-
tion that : "Thus it is that changes in the law may be
wrought gradually and imperceptibly, like those which by
process of accretion alter the course of a river and
169
change an old boundary."
Protests have been lodged against the claims of
170
all three archipelagic states analyzed m this study.
There is, however, a theory that protest alone is no more
than a temporary bar, which must be followed up and sup-
171ported by other appropriate and available remedies.
While it is arguable that any greater weight will be
attached to a protest which is persistently reiterated,
Professor Hyde at least appears to subscribe to the
necessity of "...ceaseless protests against the acts of
172the wrongdoer" ' in order to stay the maturation* of

6 y,
usage into customary law.
Those states opposed to the application of the
archipelago concept of delimitation would do well, there-
fore, while the controversy remains unsettled, to pursue
all legal means at their disposal, such as, preferably,
"bilateral negotiations, reference of the matter to the
United Nations or the International Court of Justice, or,
if deemed necessary and proper, severance of diplomatic
175
relations or the carrying out of retorsive measures. '
At a minimum, as Professor Hyde suggests, opponents of
the archipelago claims should take care to reiterate
from time to time any formal protests previously made "by
them.
Historic Title as a Justification for the Claims
As we have seen, the Philippines places great
reliance on historic title as a. basis for its claim.
Although not as thoroughly documented or argued, the
Indonesian claim likewise, by virtue of the language
employed in its assertion — "historically, the Indonesian
174
archipelago has been an entity since time immemorial,"
is clearly based, at least in part, on historic title.
Whether or not a state can be considered to have
acquired historic title to a maritime area is said to
depend upon at least three conditions:
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1) the exercise by the claimant state of authority
over the area in question;
2) the continuity of such exercise of authority;
and
3) the attitude of foreign states with respect
175to the claimant's actions.
Applying the title "acquisitive prescription" to
the process of perfecting historic title, D.H.N. Johnson,
in an article published in the British Yearbook of Inter-
national Law, describes it as:
".. .the. means by which, under international
law, legal recognition is given to the right
of a state to exercise sovereignty over
land or sea. territory in cases where that
state has, in fact, exercised its authority
in a continuous, uninterrupted, and peace-
ful manner over the area concerned for a
sufficient period of time,' provided that
all other interested and affected states
(...in the case of sea territory neighbor-
ing states and other states whose maritime




Since the assumption is that a claim to an area
as historic v/aters means a claim to that area as part of
the maritime domain of the state, the scope of the authority
which must be exercised in order to perfect historic title
177is sovereignty. Manifestations of the exercise of
sovereignty may include governmental activities such as
promulgation of laws, regulations and administrative
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measures, and the exercise of civil and criminal ju.risd.ic-
tion over the area in question. Also of great weight
in this connection is evidence that the claimant not only
legislated with respect to the area claimed, hut performed
other more physical acts as well, such as the erection of
179public works. Thus m the Mmquiers and Ecrehos Case , '
the International Court of Justice in finding for Great
Britain in an action between that country and France over
title to certain of the Channel Islands, noted the con-
struction of certain public works as a relatively signi-
ficant manifestation of the exercise of British sovereignty
over those islands. In a maritime frontier dispute between
Norway and Sweden concerning the Grisbadarna banks, the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in its award delivered in
1909, found the area in question to belong to Sweden,
stating among its reasons the factual consideration that
Sweden at some expense to herself, and in the conviction
that the area was hers, performed certain public functions,
such as erecting beacons, measuring the sea and maintaining
a lightbo at
.
The exercise of authority by a state over areas
claimed by it must, therefore, be effectively exercised,
that is, by deeds as well as by proclamations, and must
be maintained over the area for a considerable period of
181
time. No precise length of time has been prescribed as

6ao
necessary for the establishment of a usage upon which to
base historic title, but, it should be noted that in one
case, The Sc otia, as little as eight years was held suf-
ficient for the purpose of establishing as customary
international lav; certain maritime practices adopted by
1 8?
states in the interest of safe navigation.
The reactions of other states to claims to estab-
lish historic title are crucial to the perfection of such
title, as inaction on the part of foreign states may allow
historic title to vest in a claimant who has exercised
effective, continuous sovereignty during a prolonged period
18-5
of time over the area concerned. v Generally, protest is
accepted as a means of preventing the maturing of historic
title, as it acts as an indication that the protesting state
does not intend to abandon its rights and may even operate,
in the opinion of some authorities, to interrupt the running
184
of prescriptive time. With these general principles m
mind, an analysis of the historic title aspects of the
claims of Indonesia and the Philippines becomes more
meaningful
.
The better articulated historic title argument,
that of the Philippines, proceeds from the initial as-
sumption that the Treaty of Paris, reinforced by certain
subsequent international agreements touching on the
boundaries of the Philippine Islands, operated to pass
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title from Spain to the United States over "both the land
and sea areas embraced within the coordinates described in
l ft 1-)
the treaty. On the other hand, as we have seen, the
United States regards the lines established in these
treaties as merely intended to delimit the overall area
in which the land areas ceded by Spain were located.
A careful reading of the words of Article III of the
Treaty of Paris would tend to lend support to the American
interpretation. In this regard, Professor Florentino P.
Peliciano, a noted Filippino international legal scholar,
suggests that the Philippine government's interpretation
is not the only possible, nor even the most plausible,
reading of the Treaty of Paris, which simply states that
"Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known
as the Philippine Islands and comprehending the islands
within the following lines: ... ." He submits that
the natural import of these words is clearly that what
was intended to be conveyed was only the land area found
within the stated coordinates, noting that the regular
geometric nature of the lines suggests that their purpose
was not so much to indicate a political boundary as to
insure that all of the islands of the archipelago were
properly included in the transfer.
Professor Feliciano generally expresses grave
doubts as to the validity of historic title as a basis for
the claim of the Philippines. He regards the problem as
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one primarily of evidence, particularly one of inquiry into
the practice of Spain during her sovereignty over the
Philippines and of the responses, if any, thereto of other
states. Since, to his knowledge, such an inquiry had never
been undertaken, he expressed the opinion that the doctrine
of historic title was not supported by adequate evidence to
justify its assertion.
With regard to Indonesia's assertion of historic
title, one need look no further than to the Dutch ordinance
of 1939 concerning the territorial sea of the Netherlands
Indies to discover a lack of long continuous usage of
viewing what is now known as the Indonesian archipelago as
unitary. Article 1 of that ordinance defined the Nether-
lands Indies territorial sea as:
"The sea area extending to seaward to a
distance of three nautical miles from the
low-water mark of the islands or parts of
islands, which belong to Netherlands Indies
territory. . . "190
With regard to groups of two or more islands, the
ordinance granted a limited exception, permitting the
three-mile territorial sea limit to be measured from
straight lines "...connecting the outermost points of
the low-water marks of the islands on the outer edge of
the group, at the point where the distance between these
191points is not more than six miles." This regime, which
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was clearly in accord v.rith traditional concepts, remained in
effect, having been assimilated into Indonesian lav/ upon that
state's achieving independence in 19^-9, until revoked by the
192declaration of lz l- December 1957 asserting the current claim.
It appears doubtful, particularly in view of the numerous
protests lodged against the Indonesian, claim, that historic
title can have been perfected by Indonesia in the short period
since 1957-
Although it is not known to what extent, if at all,
the government of the Maldives purports to base its claim
upon the doctrine of historic waters, there clearly would
be little justification for such an assertion. Again
without knowing what acts the Maldivian government has
performed as manifestations of its exercise of sovereignty
over the claimed area, it would be safe to assume that the
Maldives, with its 115 square miles of land territory and
correspondingly small population, scarcely has' the power
or resources with which to effectively extend its sover-
eignty over 150,000 square nautical miles of the Indian
Ocean. In any event, the success of the claim, if based
on prescription, would be in doubt considering its quite
recent assertion and the opposition thereto, manifested by
protest of at least one state, the United States.
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Claims to Apply the Archipelago Concept
of Delimitation Viewed in the Light of
Existing International Law
Straight Baselines
As there is at present no generally accepted rule
of international law specifically prescribing any particu-
lar method of delimiting the territorial seas of mid-ocean
archipelagos, it would hardly he appropriate or fair to
disallow claims such as those of the Philippines, Indonesia
and the Maldives simply because they lack any sound evi-
denciary basis to bring them within the application of
the doctrine of historic waters. Furthermore, notwith-
standing the controversy surrounding these claims, it seems
doubtful that the claimants can altogether be denied the
right to apply straight baselines in delimiting their
territorial seas. The decision in the Fisheries Case, as
well as Article 4- of the Convention on the Territorial
Seas, which has its roots in that decision, both approve
this method of delimitation in the formerly equally
controversial case of coastal archipelagos. The possibi-
lity, therefore, of applying these principles by analogy
195to outlying archipelagos cannot be overlooked.
The important issue with respect to baselines is,
of course, their maximum permissible length. Despite con-
siderable discussion and effort by the various international
bodies that have considered the question since the 1930
Hague Conference, no fundamental agreement has ever been
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reached. Most of the various rules proposed, however,
did agree that baselines should he kept short —
generally at twice the width of the territorial sea or
ten miles. In view of the current trend in favor of
194 . .
wider territorial sea margins, as well as the decision
in the Fisheries Case which specifically rejected the
ten-mile rule for coastal archipelagos and approved base-
195lines of up to 44 miles m length, the present day rele-
vance of these proposed rules appears to be highly question-
able .
Again, it is clear that there is no fixed conventional
196
or customary rule as to the allowable length of such lines.
However, it is equally clear, as Mr. Evensen concluded in
his study, that "...exorbitantly long baselines, closing
vast areas of sea to free navigation and fishing, are
197
contrary to international law". Both Indonesia and the
Philippines have established baselines far exceeding in
length those at issue in the Fisheries Case—in the case
of the Philippines, some being as long as 130 and 160
198
miles. Both states, therefore, should the validity of
their use of such baselines ever be put in issue before
an international tribunal, would be hard pressed to establish
their reasonableness, necessity or propriety.
Internal Waters
Closely related to the question of baselines is
that of the character of the waters enclosed by such
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lines. Both Indonesia and the Philippines claim as internal
waters all sea areas landward of the baselines they have
established. Obviously, the extent of such internal waters
is determined by the length and location of the baselines
employed. In general, the various proposed rules drafted
by international conferences over the years were in accord
that waters between and surrounding island groups enclosed
by straight baselines should be considered as internal
199
waters. This view, at least with respect to coastal
archipelagos, was consecrated by adoption of Article 5(1)
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea, which provides
that "Waters on the landward side of the baseline of the
territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State". 200
The general community interest in freedom of navi-
gation is, of course, subject to grave jeopardy of impair-
ment by encroachments on formerly high seas areas through
abuse in application of this concept. To mitigate to some
extent the potential impact of straight baseline claims on
navigational interests, Article 5(2) of the Convention
provides that:
"Where the establishment of a straight baseline
in accordance with article 4 has the effect of
enclosing as internal waters areas which pre-
- viously had been considered as part of the
territorial sea or of the high seas, a rigjht
of innocent passage, as provided in articles
14 to 23, shall exist in those waters."
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It has been suggested that, based, upon the fore-
going article, internal waters created by application of
straight baselines are essentially legally identical to
territorial seas, as the main practical distinction between
the two lies in the limitation upon the coastal state's
sovereignty inherent in the right of innocent passage.
Since, the right of innocent passage can be denied by the
coastal state in internal waters created by straight base-
lines only in those areas which would have been so charac-
terized notwithstanding the use of straight baselines, their
use operates only to enlarge the area subject to legal rules
202
applicable to the territorial sea. Whether enclosed
areas are designated as internal waters or territorial seas,
the threat to free and unhampered access to the oceans for
all posed by exorbitant straight baseline claims remains
significant. This is so because even under the less
restrictive regime of the territorial seas, innocent passage
by foreign vessels is still subject to a large degree to
205the unilateral pleasure of the coastal state, -' while
aircraft may not penetrate the superjacent airspace without
204-
the benefit of a special treaty or agreement.
Instead of safeguarding the community interest by
imposing an arbitrary limit on the length of baselines, and
thereby limiting the extent of water areas that could be
enclosed as internal waters, the International Court of
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Justice in the Fisheries Case prescribed three criteria
as determinative of the validity of the application of a
straight baseline system: (1) that the baselines employed
follow the general direction of the coast; (2) that a close
relationship exist between the sea areas claimed and sur-
rounding land formations, and (3) the existence of economic
205interests peculiar to the region as evidenced by long usage.
Of the three, the second is the most relevant to the inter-
nal waters question, in the words of the Court: "The real
question raised in the choice of baselines is in effect
whether certain areas lying within these lines are suf-
ficiently closely linked to the land domain as to be
subject to the regime of internal waters."
The rule proposed by Mr. Evensen in his 1958 study
drew heavily upon the reasoning in the Fisheries Case in
permitting the use of straight baselines as provided in
Article LY of the Convention on the Territorial Sea (at
the time of the study, draft Article 5) for delimiting the
territorial seas of outlying archipelagos. The first of
the Court's criteria was amended in his proposal to require
that the baselines follow the "...general direction of the
207
coast of the archipelago viewed as a whole" ; the second
criterion, the linkage between sea domain and land terri-
tory, was also stressed in his proposal; but the third,
concerning the existence of economic interests peculiar to
the region, was given scant mention. Mr. Evensen
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acknowledged the lack of any fixed maximum length for
baselines and made no attempt to suggest such a limit,
choosing instead to caution against "exorbitantly long
baselines", 209 on the theory that as their length in-
creases, the closeness of the relationship between the
land domain and water area concerned necessarily de-
creases. His proposed rule also included an essential
safeguard for freedom of navigation by stipulating in
terms similar to Article 5(2) of the Convention on the
Territorial Sea that where waters of an archipelago lying
within straight baselines form a strait, such waters
cannot be closed to innocent passage of foreign vessels. 210
Recognizing that the foregoing rules are not
binding upon states and that they suffer from an inherent
vagueness, particularly as to the critical factor of
length of baselines, it is nevertheless interesting to
apply them, as an international tribunal might if faced
with the issue, to the current claims of archipelagic states.
In so doing, the validity of major portions of those claims
is immediately called into question. For example, in what
way is the entire 86,000 square mile area of the Sulu Sea
so related to neighboring Philippine land territory, men
of which, such as Palawan and Mindanao, is relatively sparsely
populated, 211 as to justify its characterization as internal
waters. The same question may be asked with respect to
Indonesia's claim to regard the entire Java Sea, which
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extends some 600 miles from east to west arid 200 miles from
212
north to south, as inland waters. No doubt the ingenuity
of the claimants would he equal to the task of producing
reasons to support their claims to these areas, hut, con-
sidering the importance and sheer size of the seas con-
cerned, such reasons would have to he most compelling for
an international court to find them sufficient.
The Territorial Sea and Innocent Pas sage
Since claims to treat ocean areas as territorial
waters amount in practice to assertions of complete, con-
tinuous and permanent authority over such waters, operating
in effect to place them under the full sovereignty of the
claimant state, save for the somewhat dubious right of
213innocent passage, the interests of other states, as well
as those of the general community, are substantially affected
by such claims. The general community interest in the ter-
ritorial sea lies primarily in its usefulness as a medium
for international transport and communication, while the
exclusive interests of the littoral state extend to matters
such as control over it as an important means of access to
its land mass, both for the purpose of warding off potential
threats to its security, as well as for the purpose of
protecting internal value processes, particularly those
214
centering around wealth and well-being. The potential
for conflict between these diverging interests is amply
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illustrated "by the controversy surrounding the claims of
archipelagic states.
Two legal problems concerning the regime of the
territorial sea are of particular relevance to this study,
namely, the validity of the "breadth of margin claimed, and
the nature and reliability of the right of innocent passage
available therein for foreign shipping.
The question of the "breadth of the territorial
sea has long been one of the most controversial problems
of international law. Beginning in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the concept of the territorial sea
began to develop through a process of interaction comprised
of conflicting claims and counter-claims. Out of this pro-
cess there gradually developed, by the early part of this
century, a consensus of nearly all coastal states claiming
a territorial sea that the appropriate width was three
miles. Some writers even went so far as to contend that
this consensus had ripened into a. rule of customary in-
216ternational law. Despite the once general acceptance
of the three-mile limit, there has been in recent years a
marked increase in the number of states claiming territorial
seas in excess of that width. State practice in this regard
has been in a state of rapidly accelerating change, with new
and increasingly expansive claims becoming commonplace.
Thus of 133 states and dependent areas surveyed by the
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the United States Department of State during 1968, 53 were
found to adhere to the traditional three-mile limit, while
the balance claimed wider margins ranging, in the main,
between three and twelve miles, with the latter being the
preponderant measure at z l7 !- claims. A handful only, including
a number of South American states claiming 200-mile limits,
217have asserted claims beyond 12 miles.
All attempts thus far by international conferences
to resolve the matter by codification have come to nought.
The first such attempt during the 1930 Hague Conference met
with so much diversity of opinion that the committee studying
the problem was unable to agree on a proposed three-mile
219
pi o
rule, and the question never came to a vote. The issue
met a similar fate during the Geneva Conventions of 1958
and I960, with the latter failing by one vote to reach agree-
ment on a joint United States-Canadian proposal for a six-
mile territorial sea coupled with an additional six-mile
i *- V 220exclusive fishing zone.
The International Law Commission in 1955 concluded
in its draft articles on the regime of the territorial sea
that international practice was not uniform with regard to
application of the traditional three-mile limit; that
international lav/ would not permit claims in excess of twelve
miles, and that states need not recognize claims beyond
ppi
three miles. The policy of the United States until
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quite recently was in accord with the last observation of the
draft articles, namely, it adhered to the three-mile limit
and acknowledged no obligation to recognize claims "by other
222
states to greater breadths. Without attempting to add
to the debate over the wisdom or legality of claims to
territorial sea margins greater than the traditional three-
mile width, it appears safe to say that it is highly questionable
whether the three-mile limit still constitutes the governing
rule of international law. A majority of states have in
recent years rejected that rule, to the point where pres-
225
sure for a wider regime is becoming almost irresistible.
Indeed, the United States, formerly the most adamant proponent
of the three-mile limit, has recently announced its willingness,
under certain conditions, to agree to a uniform twelve-mile
. . 224-limit
.
In the light of this trend and the opinion of the
International Law Commission as expressed in its draft
article in 1955? which although not binding international
law, nevertheless appears to be a correct restatement of
the international consensus on the subject, Indonesia's
claim to a twelve-mile margin can hardly be condemned as
unjustifiable. The territorial seas claims of the
Philippines and the Maldives, on the other hand, pose an
entirely different problem, as neither purports to lay
claim to any specific width of territorial seas. SCn the
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case of the Philippines, the claim is to competence over
all waters seaward of the "baselines established in her
225
national legislation as bounded "by her so-called
226
"treaty limits."' In general, the claimed areas far
exceed even twelve miles in breadth, and in the most ex-
treme instance extends to a distance of 285 miles between
227the treaty line and the nearest Philippine land territory.
The Maldivian claim differs from that of the Philippines
in that the territorial sea of that state is apparently
not measured from any territorially related baseline
system, but, rather consists of all waters contained with-
in a specified set of coordinates. Both claims, therefore,
do violence to Article 6 of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea, which provides that "the outer limit of the territorial
sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from
the nearest point on the baseline equal to the breadth of
228the territorial sea". The Philippine violation lies
in the failure of the outer limit of its territorial sea
to run parallel at a uniform width to its baselines, while
that of the Maldives lies in a lack of both baselines and
a uniform, parallel width of margin.
In a large sense, therefore, both the Philippine
and Maldivian claims can be equated to the recent expansive
claims of states such as Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, El
229Salvador, Panama and Peru, which have likewise^ failed to
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gain the acceptance of the world, community. Despite the
absence of any specific limit in international law, states,
nevertheless, are not at liberty to abuse the right of
230determining the width of their territorial seas. Ac-
cordingly, neither the Philippine nor the Maldivian claims
to competence over such vast areas of open seas appears to
be justified.
The second, but no less important, area of concern
pertinent to this discussion is the question of the nature
and quality of the rights conferred in archipelagic waters
under the concept of innocent passage. Article 14- of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea provides, in pertinent
part, that "...ships of all States. . .shall enjoy the right
of innocent passage through the territorial sea." With
respect to straits, which constitute an especially important
element of the archipelago problem, the Convention at Arti-
cle 16(4) provides that "there shall be no suspension of
the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which
are used for international navigation between one part of
the high seas and another part of the high seas or the
232territorial seas of another state." The Convention
also, as mentioned previously, in Article 5(2) guarantees
innocent passage through waters which have been transformed
from territorial sea or high seas into internal waters as a




The concept of innocent pp,ssage has "been described
as a compromise "between the doctrine of the freedom of the
seas and the principle of sovereignty of states. Colombos
puts it in terms of an "attempt to reconcile the freedom of
255
ocean navigation with the theory of territorial waters."
Professor McDougal also looks upon the concept as a com-
promise calling on the one hand for "...free access to the
territorial sea and on the other for restrictions of varying
254
severity on that access." In this regard, the community
interest in the full and efficient use of the oceans, in
terms of freedom of passage, coincides with the exclusive
coastal interest common to all states in protecting local
value processes. The latter is recognized in the qualifi-
cation that passage must he innocent , that is not offensive
to certain coastal interests, m order to be privileged. ^-
It should be noted at the outset that the right of innocent
passage is inapplicable with respect to three important
types of passage, namely, submerged passage of submarines,
which must, pursuant to Article 14(6) of the Convention,
navigate on the surface and display their flags while in
the territorial sea; to overflight, as aircraft have no
256
right to overfly the territorial sea of another state;
257
and to passage through internal waters.
The key word in the principle is "innocent", and
the problem is, obviously, who is to determine the inno-
cence, vel non
,
of a particular passage. The Convention itself
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attempts to define the word "innocent" in paragraph 4- of
Article 14, which states that "passage is innocent so long
as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or se-
238
curity of the coastal State." As to who is to apply
this standard, Professor McDougal states that "...the
authority accorded a coastal state in the territorial sea
is, and must be, very comprehensive indeed, extending even
to a substantial measure of discretion in determining the
innocent character of a particular passage, with only the
ordinary sanctions of reciprocity and retaliation avail-
able to assure reasonable exercise of discretion." He
has also described the concept of innocent passage as "...
but another, semantically equivalent, way of talking about
the scope of coastal authority over access to the terri-
,
. , ,,24-0tonal sea.
As mentioned above, claims to subject certain waters
to the regime of the territorial sea amount, in effect,
to claims to assert complete, continuous and permanent
authority over them, in short full sovereignty, subject
241
only to the right of innocent passage. The following
have been listed among the components of this claimed
authority: 1) competence to exclude or suspend passage;
2) authority to regulate navigation; 3) competence over
events or persons on board passing vessels, as well as over
the vessel itself for the purpose of judging claims against
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it; 4) authority to prescribe and apply regulations concern-
ing security, customs, health, and pollution, and 5) authority
242
to control "belligerent use of neutral waters.
The greatest potential threat to the general com-
munity interest in the fullest productive use of the sea
posed "by the expansive territorial sea claims of the
archipelagic states lies in the risk that coastal states
in the exercise of their claimed authority might unreasonably
act to restrict the right of innocent passage, perhaps for
entirely arbitrary reasons. This essential dependence of
the right of innocent passage upon the unilateral goodwill
of the littoral state has been amply illustrated by the
action taken in 1958 by the Indonesian government in pro-
hibiting Dutch vessels from passing, without prior per-
mission, through Indonesian territorial waters, save for
245
along one certain sea route. A similar edict was
pronounced during i960 forbidding Dutch vessels to pick
244
up or discharge passengers or cargo in Indonesian waters.
Other impediments to the freedom of the sea inherent in the
concept of the territorial sea, such as the absence of a
right of overflight and restriction upon submarine
navigation, are, of course, necessarily extended in direct
proportion to the size of the territorial sea claim asserted.
Applying the test requiring that an assertion of
authority be reasonably proportionate to the interests sought
thereby to be protected, at the same time keeping in mind
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the extent of interference with community interests and
uses, y to the claims of the archipelagic states prompts
the conclusion that large portions of the areas claimed as
territorial seas, not to mention those deemed internal waters,
are clearly unreasonable encroachments on the high seas
"bearing no justifiable relation to the bona fide needs of
the claimants. Such questionable areas would include, for
example, much of the area claimed by the Philippines as
within her so-called "treaty limits".
Policy Appraisal——Balancing the Interests
The nature and extent of the concentration of exclu-
sive coastal interests in adjacent waters peculiar to island-
based states and the community interest in the same waters
is discussed above at some length. The task of reconciling
or balancing these largely conflicting interests on a uni-
versal basis, that is, on a basis applicable at once to all
archipelagos, is almost impossible, considering the wide
variations that exist, not only in terms of geography, but
with respect to social, political and economic factors
that cause the importance attached to any particular coastal
interest to vary considerably among archipelagic states.
Needless to say, the intensity of the concentration of
community interests in uses such as for example, fishing or
transportation, will vary also depending upon the availability
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and desirability of resources in the first instance, and
upon the location of the archipelago with relation to in-
ternational trade routes in the second. Accordingly, the
comments that follow are necessarily general in scope,
recognizing that conditions do vary widely, not only as
between different archipelagos, but within specific island
groups as well.
This attempt to strike an effective balance between
the exclusive interests of the archipelagic states and the
community interest will proceed on the assumption postulated
by Professor McDougal that the community goal is, or should
be, "...the greatest production and widest possible sharing
246
of values among people", keeping in mind the validity of
those traditional assertions of coastal control reasonably
necessary for a state to both protect its security and to
gain reasonable access to the resources of the seas.
In summary, the three major components of the
concentration of archipelagic coastal interests, as most
ably described by Mr. Tolentino during the I960 Geneva
Conference are the security of the state, the protection
of its commercial, fiscal and political interests, and
247the appropriation and protection of ocean resources.
Turning first to security considerations, speci-
fically the concern, as most vocally expressed by Indo-
nesia, for the safety of the state's population and
territory in the event of naval hostilities in its waters
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. . 248in which it is not a participant, ' the question of the
duties imposed by neutrality arises. Under Article 5 of
Hague Convention XIII, the use of neutral ports and waters
as a base for operations against an enemy is forbidden
249to belligerents. From this rule flows the logical
conclusion that a neutral must do everything in its power
250to prevent belligerents from thus abusing its territory.
This task is difficult enough to accomplish within a three-
mile territorial sea by states possessing modern and effi-
251
cient naval forces, let alone by the relatively poorly
equipped forces available to uncler-developed states such
as Indonesia, the Philippines and the Maldives, which claim
vastly larger sea areas. It stands to reason that the wider
the territorial sea, the ea.sier it becomes for an unprincipled
belligerent to abuse the neutrality of a state, and, perforce,
for the neutral state to prevent such abuse. If a neutral
is unwilling or unable effectively to perform its duty in
this respect, a participant is authorized, and may be ex-
pected, to take action against enemy vessels abusing neutral
252territorial seas. Thus, to a large extent, the security
sought by the archipelagic claimants through their expansive
claims, to the extent that they invite the presence of
warships of unscrupulous belligerents, is, if not defeated,
certainly not enhanced by such assertions. The argument that
an expanded territorial sea is essential to national defense
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"because of the range and destructive capacity of modern
weapons, the speed of modern aircraft and ships, along with
other technological factors, likewise tends to fall apart
under the force of its own logic, as not even the most
expansive sea margin imaginable is adequate to effectively
insulate any state from modern weaponry. Clearly, therefore,
the extent of the authority asserted "by the archipelagic
claimants in the name of security is not at all propor-
tionate to the reasonable protection of that interest. The
potential of serious interference with international sea
and air transport posed by claims entailing the creation of
extensive regions of internal waters within straight base-
lines and of equally extensive reaches of territorial sea,
in both of which the claimant may exercise extensive, indeed
exclusive, discretionary control over access, militates
against the propriety of the archipelagic claims as pre-
sently formulated.
The extent of authority asserted for the protection
of the commercial, fiscal and political interests of the
claimants likewise appears to weigh ratherly lightly in
the scales of proportionality when measured against the
general community interest in freedom of navigation. It
is understood that ocean transport is essential to the
trade and communications of an island-based state. How-
ever, this need is certainly not basically incompatible
with the fullest and freest use of the same waters by
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international traffic. Turning again to the duties of
coastal states, it is questionable, in the light of
Article 15(2) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea,
which requires "the coastal State... to give appropriate
publicity to any dangers to navigation, of which it has
253knowledge, within its territorial sea", whether under-
developed states, such as those involved in the archipelago
problem, are either able or willing to fulfill their
obligations toward foreign vessels within their claimed
sea domains. Implicit in the Convention's requirement is,
at a minimum, the provision of buoys, light-houses and
other navigational aids to mark channels and hazards. The
ability of these states to adequately provide such naviga-
tional aids within their claimed sea domains is greatly
in doubt, considering estimates that for the United States
to meet its obligations to foreign shipping, in the event
of an. increase of its territorial sea from three to twelve
miles, would require an initial capital outlay of $8
million, plus added annual operating costs of $180 million.
Archipelagic states are no less, and perhaps to
some extent more, dependent upon unhampered sea-borne
commerce for their economic viability than other states.
As underdeveloped nations, they share a need for importa-
tion, at the lowest possible cost, of manufactured goods
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necessary for development. It is possible that, in the
flush of their new found independence and assertions of
sovereignty through expansive territorial sea claims, they
have lost sight of the potential lurking in those very
claims for added costs to themselves for ocean transported
goods. Obviously, if merchant vessels are required to
avoid large areas of formerly high seas "because of adverse
coastal assertions of authority, the result will be increased
shipping costs and, necessarily, higher prices to the con-
258
sumer, including, ultimately, the archipelagic states. y
Likewise, control of smuggling and other violations
of commercial or fiscal regulations of the coastal state,
while of vital concern, clearly does not justify or require
complete competence, including arbitrary authority to exclude
foreign vessels, over adjacent waters, particularly when more
selective measures are available.
The proponents of the archipelago concept rely to
a very great extent for justification of their claims upon
a purported need to extend their competence over off-
shore fisheries in order to conserve fish and other eco-
nomic resources for their own fishing industries and popu-
lations. The principal effect of such claims is to deprive
other states of the unequivocal right of access to fishing
256grounds formerly freely available to all. y
Here again, the scope of authority sought --to be
asserted falls short of any proportionality to the interest
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it is designed to protect, as the reasoning of the claim-
ants is "based to a great extent upon certain logical fallacies,
Implicit in the claimant's assertions are the twin assinnp-
tions that by merely extending their sea margins, more
fish will be caught by their own fishermen, while foreigners
will be prevented from depleting available resources. This
reasoning further assumes that the local fishing industry is
equal to the task of achieving maximum yields; that the
major sources of supply are located within the claimed
area of competence, and that this area will always be ade-
257quate to meet local needs. yt The "backwardness of the
local fishing industries of the claimants is an established
fact, as is the only marginal exploitation of the fisheries
pro
in their adjacent waters. ^ As recent studies in fishing
technology have established that such marginal fishing
operations are basically uneconomical and wasteful, it can
he fairly said that the act of appropriating all of the living
resources in adjacent waters by these claimants amounts
to selfishness, not only as to their use, but as to their
259
non-use as well. > J
A basic characteristic of most fish is that even
the more sedentary species range over wide distances of the
continental shelves, while pelagic varieties are known to
travel over even greater expanses of water during their
life cycles, both varieties doing so completely without
regard to political boundaries. This biological fact
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contradicts directly the expectation of the claimants
that the major sources of supply are located within the
areas claimed "by them, and renders their attempts at con-
servation and achieving exclusive access largely illusory.
This leads to the third assumption, namely that the claimed
areas will always suffice for the claimant's needs. This
assumption overlooks, however, the very real possibility
that certain species of fish, with their inherent disdain
for political boundaries, might choose to leave the claimed
areas, or to concentrate more densely elsewhere. Such a
trend could be caused "by depletion brought about by over-
fishing, or by some natural or artificial calamity, such as
disease or pollution. Under such circumstances, claimants
who are now contending for expanded competence to exclude
others in their own adjacent waters might well find that
their interests had shifted toward an ability to fish in
other waters.
There is, above all, a moral problem involved in
claims, such as those of the archipelagic states, which
discriminate against all the peoples of the world with
respect to as basic a resource as food. Such discrimina-
tion has come to be accepted with respect to land-based
resources and to the resources of the continental shelf
located within the 200 meter isobath or beyond to the depth
permitting exploitation. However, if a right not~to be
discriminated against with regard to fishing grounds can
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"be said to exist, it is "because such resources are so
peculiarly adapted, and have for centuries "been freely
available, for community use.
In summation, it seems well established that none
of these claims to delimit the territorial sea in ac-
cordance with the archipelago concept adequately takes
into account the deprivations to community interests that
necessarily flow from a heavy-handed application of that
principle. Applying the test of proportionality to these
claims reveals that, to a large extent, the interests
sought to be protected by expanded sea frontiers are, more
often than not," to some extent prejudiced, rather than
served by such action. The following section, therefore,
will attempt to suggest an alternative approach to the
problem.
Recommendation
The preceding discussion leads to the inevitable
conclusion that, in the words of Professor Feliciano, the
archipelagic claimants have employed "...an unnecessarily
blunt and rigid instrument" J in attempting to protect
their legitimate coastal interests by way of an overly
expansive application of the archipelago concept of delimi-
tation, when much more selective and flexible approaches,
such as the creation of appropriate contiguous zones,
having a lower potential for conflict with equally
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legitimate community interests, are available. This is
not meant to suggest, however, an absolute abandonment of
the straight baseline method of delimitation in these cases
and an unequivocal return to the low-water mark baseline
264for archipelagos. On the contrary, as suggested above,
this method of delimitation, due to the absence of generally
accepted prescriptions and by analogy to the rules governing
coastal island groups embodied in the Fisheries Case deci-
sion and Article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea, can hardly be condemned out of hand as contrary to
established international law. The difficulty lies in the
manner and, perhaps, the spirit in which this method has
been applied by certain states. It can be fairly stated
that, in a large sense, the archipelagic states have
strained the permissible limits of the straight baseline
approach by going far beyond the very reasonable criteria
for its application established in the Fisheries Case.
While the most desirable immediate solution would be a
unilateral adjustment of these claims. to bring them with-
in a more reasonable framework, considering factors such
as nationalism and the relative quiescence of the problem,
such a turn of events can hardly be expected. With regard
to the current lull in the controversy, it is interesting
to note that the United States, at least, has attempted to
avoid any direct confrontations over access to archipelagic
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waters, while withholding recognition of such claims. At
the same time, none of the archipelagic states have attempted
to interfere with navigation by American ships within their
claimed waters.
The United Nations General Assembly has called for
a third conference on the law of the sea, to convene during
266
1973, for the purpose of establishing an equitable
regime for the sea-bed lying beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction and for further work on the entire spectrum of
law of the sea matters, including the territorial sea and
the question of its breadth. While agreement on these vital
questions is obviously of paramount importance, it would
seem that, due to the identity of many of the issues in-
volved, the time would be ripe for a resolution of the
archipelago problem as well. Indeed, such a resolution
could be at least partially achieved as a result of a
reasonable agreement on the general territorial sea
question. The United States government has, in this
regard, recently announced its views concerning a proposed
territorial sea regime. In broad terms, these views call
for setting the limit of the territorial sea at twelve
miles, provided agreement is reached concerning reliable
guarantees for the right of innocent passage and freedom of
transit through and over international straits, and for




states on the high seas. ' Such a regime, particularly
one coupled with a provision for preferential fishing rights,
should be more than adequate for the protection of the
coastal interests of archipelagic states. It would, how-
ever, standing alone, apply only to areas seaward of the
straight baseline systems of such states, leaving unresolved
the thorny problem of the waters enclosed by those lines,
which are currently characterized as internal waters.
As suggested previously, } under existing norms,
internal waters created by application of straight base-
lines are essentially identical in legal effect to terri-
torial seas, since they are equally subject to the right
269
of innocent passage of foreign vessels. It seems, there-
fore, somewhat specious, even under the current regime, to
confuse matters by perpetuating what amounts to a semantical
anamoly. Assuming, therefore, a general agreement on the
vital issues of the breadth of the territorial sea and of
innocent passage, especially through international straits,
including overflight, essentially along the lines envisioned
by the United States government, the mid-ocean archipelago
delimitation problem could largely be resolved by further
agreement on a rule essentially identical to that laid down
in the Fisheries Case and in existing Article 4 of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea. The major proposed
distinction would be that v/aters landward of appropriately
adjusted existing straight baseline systems, would be
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redesignated as territorial waters, thereby removing, under
hopefully improved provisions concerning innocent passage
and overflight, the gravest threats to the community interest
in free navigation. Internal waters, in the meantime, would
"be established in accordance with the ordinary rules, by
reference to a secondary baseline system. Thus, in the
ordinary case, internal waters would comprise those waters
landward of this secondary baseline, which would ordinarily
270follow the sinuosities of the coast at the low-water mark.
Exceptions to the foregoing would, of course, be recognized
271for bays and rivers flowing into the sea, while, by
assimilating the principal islands of the group to the
"mainland" presently contemplated in Article 4- of the Con-
vention, this secondary baseline system could be constructed
in such a way as to create internal waters in coastal areas
appropriately "indented and cut into", provided the criteria
presently prescribed in Article 4 are met.
As in Mr. Evensen's proposal, and as the Internationa!
Court refrained from doing in the Fisheries Case, no maximum
length for baselines is suggested in this study, nor, for
that matter, is one considered desirable. While this would
operate to leave a large area for potential abuse by states
in the exercise of their discretion in delimiting their sea
boundaries, it, nevertheless, achieves the object of flexi-
bility, which, considering the wide geographical ,"* social,
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political and economic variations among archipelagos, is
considered a far more desirable end. This proposal is also
subject to criticism on the ground that, even if applied
conservatively and in good faith, the archipelagic states
will still be able to subject large areas to the regime of
the territorial sea. The answer, of course, is that a
satisfactory outcome to the forthcoming Conference will
hopefully eliminate most of the major disabilities inherent
in the concept of the territorial sea currently adversely
affecting community interests. In any event, archipelagic
coastal interests viewed in context are such as to legiti-
mately require some measure of expanded authority over
adjacent waters. To offer such states anything significantly-
less comprehensive in scope would, therefore, in all likeli-
hood foreclose the possibility of any sort of rational
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